"What does it mean to be subject to desubjectification?" (142).
I particularly responded to this Agamben quote questioning peoples' ability to assume the "vacant place" of the subject when they have lost the self-identity necessary to be a subject. The very fact that the place, however, is referred to as "vacant" produces a sentiment of emptiness, much like the individual himself. Can an empty person assume an empty position? For Agamben, the empty person or the "muselmann" loses touch with reality and therefore cannot act as a witness to himself or utilize the "I" shifter. As mentioned in lecture, Agamben opposes the idea that in order to be human, language must be employed as he believes this idea would exclude the musselmann from humanity. By believing the musselmann cannot perceive himself fully and will consequentially fall prey to desubjectification, Agamben also excludes the muselmann from humanity--to what degree is a "subject" solely a tangible being and to what degree is a "subject" the ability to use "I"?
Friday, April 24, 2009
Thursday, April 23, 2009
Similar Image or Semblance Image
"The image is neither nothing, nor all, nor is it one--it is not even two. It is deployed according to the minimum complexity supposed by two points of view that confront each other under the gaze of a third" (152).
This quote comes from the beginning of Didi-Huberman's work. As I was starting the essay, I was surprised that I read the specific sentence more than 3 times. Even after doing so, I was still confused and unsure about what he meant. However, the photos illustrated in the later parts of his work definitely help me better understand. During the lecture on Thursday, I found Professor Doane's explanation interesting and very helpful. As Ryan notes in his post, it seems necessary for a photo image that the image needs associable events to "augment" meaning of the image.
This quote comes from the beginning of Didi-Huberman's work. As I was starting the essay, I was surprised that I read the specific sentence more than 3 times. Even after doing so, I was still confused and unsure about what he meant. However, the photos illustrated in the later parts of his work definitely help me better understand. During the lecture on Thursday, I found Professor Doane's explanation interesting and very helpful. As Ryan notes in his post, it seems necessary for a photo image that the image needs associable events to "augment" meaning of the image.
I found Prof. Doane's lecture on the 4 images that Didi-Huberman presents and analyzes to be extremely intriguing, especially when juxtaposed with the cropped picture of the women running to the gas chambers. It raises the question to me of if images can represent events due to their extreme changeability; the cropped image loses the traces of risk involved in taking them, thus changing the event in a sense that the photos are trying to represent. While both photo images picture a scene in a larger context, by cropping the photo, the meaning seems to change. Which in my mind suggests that images alone cannot solely represent events such as the Holocaust. More context is needed to augment the images.
"According to the law that what man despises is also what he fears resembles him, the Muselmann is universally avoided because everyone in the camp recognizes himself in his disfigured face." (Agamben, 52)
Something triggered in my memory when I came to this line, and I realized that it reminded me of Freud's Oedipus complex as discussed, I believe, in "The Uncanny." In both of these instances, a human subjected to marginalization by a greater force at power (the woman and the Muselmann) appears to another being as inferior to a degree; the woman has been conquered by castration, the Muselmann has been denigrated as a non-being unable to experience neither life nor death. But doesn't Freud view his concept of the uncanny as a return to an earlier state of things, even a return to death? Does a man, when confronted with the Muselmann, seek a return at all in that vein?
Something triggered in my memory when I came to this line, and I realized that it reminded me of Freud's Oedipus complex as discussed, I believe, in "The Uncanny." In both of these instances, a human subjected to marginalization by a greater force at power (the woman and the Muselmann) appears to another being as inferior to a degree; the woman has been conquered by castration, the Muselmann has been denigrated as a non-being unable to experience neither life nor death. But doesn't Freud view his concept of the uncanny as a return to an earlier state of things, even a return to death? Does a man, when confronted with the Muselmann, seek a return at all in that vein?
1. Didi-Huberman discusses the Holocaust as an event beyond human interpretation or imagination; the destruction was something entirely incomprehensible to us beyond statistics and death tolls.
2. The sublime, according to Lyotard, is "when the imagination fails to present an object which might, if only in principle, come to match a concept" (What is Postmodernism?, p. 78). He goes on to say that "[ideas about the sublime] impart no knowledge about reality..." (78).
Does this mean that (a) the Holocaust was a sublime event? and (b) that it cannot be considered reality or history from which we can learn?
2. The sublime, according to Lyotard, is "when the imagination fails to present an object which might, if only in principle, come to match a concept" (What is Postmodernism?, p. 78). He goes on to say that "[ideas about the sublime] impart no knowledge about reality..." (78).
Does this mean that (a) the Holocaust was a sublime event? and (b) that it cannot be considered reality or history from which we can learn?
A Re-turn that is not a Return
I will begin by expressing my delight at the gesture towards an apparent return to the real and to the human in the texts assigned for this week and my up-set at the realization that this gesture is performed in light of tragedies that marked the human and (so) real history.
Yet, I note that this (apparent) “return” involves not a bracketing or absolute denial of structuralism or poststructuralism (or postmodernism) but a full embracing and completion of it: both Agamben and Didi-Huberman have learned the lessons of difference “(or to borrow Derrida’s coinage) (of) differences” (Didi-Huberman, 121) and of the annihilation of “the One” (totality) – thus, Didi-Huberman calls for “multiple singularities always susceptible to differences, or to differances” (121) while Agamben sees himself as bringing to completion the work of Benveniste and Foucault. In this sense, Agamben’s and Didi-Huberman’s moves represent not a return, but ,rather, a re-turn.
I also observe that both Agamben and Didi-Huberman ground their theories in the reference to exceptional events that recently marked human history (Auschwitz), (re-)turning to that which has been designated as the un-representable and, thus, realizing Lyotard’s concluding demands in the Manifesto for/about a Post-Modern condition: “Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unrepresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the name.” (Lyotard, 82)
Lastly, I reflect on the impossibility to see and to speak about “that which remains unspoken”/unseen (to extrapolate and “adjust” Wittgenstein) that both thinkers refer to in the readings for this week. In Didi-Huberman’s case, this impossibility is formulated in terms of “that which remains inaccessible as an all” (p. 138). For Agamben, the impossibility is conceptualized as the impossibility to bear witness (which, nevertheless, becomes a possibility with the figure of the Muselmann).
I propose that in order to fill the “lacunas” that these two undertakings of a re-turn open and confront with, a re-turn to and of metaphysics is necessary.
Yet, I note that this (apparent) “return” involves not a bracketing or absolute denial of structuralism or poststructuralism (or postmodernism) but a full embracing and completion of it: both Agamben and Didi-Huberman have learned the lessons of difference “(or to borrow Derrida’s coinage) (of) differences” (Didi-Huberman, 121) and of the annihilation of “the One” (totality) – thus, Didi-Huberman calls for “multiple singularities always susceptible to differences, or to differances” (121) while Agamben sees himself as bringing to completion the work of Benveniste and Foucault. In this sense, Agamben’s and Didi-Huberman’s moves represent not a return, but ,rather, a re-turn.
I also observe that both Agamben and Didi-Huberman ground their theories in the reference to exceptional events that recently marked human history (Auschwitz), (re-)turning to that which has been designated as the un-representable and, thus, realizing Lyotard’s concluding demands in the Manifesto for/about a Post-Modern condition: “Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unrepresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the name.” (Lyotard, 82)
Lastly, I reflect on the impossibility to see and to speak about “that which remains unspoken”/unseen (to extrapolate and “adjust” Wittgenstein) that both thinkers refer to in the readings for this week. In Didi-Huberman’s case, this impossibility is formulated in terms of “that which remains inaccessible as an all” (p. 138). For Agamben, the impossibility is conceptualized as the impossibility to bear witness (which, nevertheless, becomes a possibility with the figure of the Muselmann).
I propose that in order to fill the “lacunas” that these two undertakings of a re-turn open and confront with, a re-turn to and of metaphysics is necessary.
Didi-Huberman says, "lanzman thinks that no image is capable of "saying" that history, which is why he tirelessly films the witnesses' speech. Godard thinks that henceforth all images will speak to us only of that history (but to say that "they speak of it" does not mean that they "say it", which is why he tirelessly reexamines our entire visual culture in light of this question......They boldly mix the historical archive--which is omnipresent--with the artistic repertoire of world cinema. they show a lot, they make a montage of everything with everything. so a certain suspicion arises: the suspicion that they are lying about everything."
this reminds me of Minh-ha's narration of Reassemblage when she says something to the effect that she doesn't intend to speak about the people but rather, to speak near by the people. the ethnographic context of that documentary (if we can agree to classify at all) is the discourse of the other and the impossibility of understanding the other, which inherently is our inability to represent other. given that thought, how is it that the process transcends the inability of the medium? why is the process less problematic than the representation itself? can ethics be a medium?
this reminds me of Minh-ha's narration of Reassemblage when she says something to the effect that she doesn't intend to speak about the people but rather, to speak near by the people. the ethnographic context of that documentary (if we can agree to classify at all) is the discourse of the other and the impossibility of understanding the other, which inherently is our inability to represent other. given that thought, how is it that the process transcends the inability of the medium? why is the process less problematic than the representation itself? can ethics be a medium?
Friday, April 17, 2009
Hyperreal and Imaginary
"Disneyland imaginary is neither true or false: it is a deterrence machine set up in order to rejuvenate in reverse the fiction of the real" (175).
Jean Baudrillard argues that Disneyland presents what are very realistic, but fake reality as imaginary. While presenting its imaginary features, it allows people to differentiate between reality and imaginary: people would believe, he claims, that Disneyland is imaginary and that the surroundings of Disneyland are real. However, Baudrillard makes his argument more interesting by asserting that "in fact all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real" (175). I found this example very intriguing, for it well explained what masks the absence of a besic reality.
Jean Baudrillard argues that Disneyland presents what are very realistic, but fake reality as imaginary. While presenting its imaginary features, it allows people to differentiate between reality and imaginary: people would believe, he claims, that Disneyland is imaginary and that the surroundings of Disneyland are real. However, Baudrillard makes his argument more interesting by asserting that "in fact all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real" (175). I found this example very intriguing, for it well explained what masks the absence of a besic reality.
Thursday, April 16, 2009
In Jameson's writing on post-structuralism, I question whether he is referring to the physical, the psychological, or both. For instance, he claims that post-modernism relies on the idea of borrowing and recycling from the past yet he also believes that a post-modern product is rooted in the present and contains no history. Do the actions of borrowing and recycling result only within physical space? If such is the case, is it the psychological state that inhibits the past? Which state is responsible for post-modernism? For Jameson, post-modernism is fragmented (In the physical and psychological? In the past and the present? In the idea of mixed media?) yet also flat. Is postmodernism fragmented in the sense of aesthetics? It seems that if the period were to be fragmented in the sense of the psychological, post-modernism would hardly be depthless or flat.
the representation of representation, or the image of an image, presents an interesting discourse in Baudrillard text, yet not entirely new. why is it that modern media affords the fodder for this kind of discourse and not age old gossip, or image? humans have always represented the world around them, why is it that this age of representation presents a whole new world? Can the nature of television and immediacy or the loss of distance really change our landscape this radically?
Towards a Post-Modern Sense of Time/Presence
“the breakdown of temporality suddenly releases this present of time from all the activities and the intentionalities that might focus it and make it a space of praxis; thereby isolated, that present suddenly engulfs the subject with undescribable vividness, a materiality of perception properly overwhelming, which effectively dramatizes the power of the material – better still, the literal – Signifier in isolation.” (Jameson, 13-4)
In my post today, I would like to interrogate Jameson’s contention about the move “beyond real historical time” (10) as distinctly characterizing postmodernism as well as the “nostalgia mode” (that paradoxically accompanies the first) as defining the postmodern experience of time. If deconstruction is indeed the postmodern strategy par excellence (which Jameson does not explicitly claim in this essay, however), then it appears to me – in light of Jameson’s argument – that the relation of postmodernism to time can be read in terms of the deconstruction of this category (which is a logical impossibility if we accept Kant’s proposition that time – just like space – is an a priori intuition). The result is, according to Jameson, a sense of intense present-ness, established and reinforced through pastiche – the mechanism that operates to ensure the cultural dominance of postmodernism.
In opposition to Jameson’s argument, I would suggest that, rather than a “desperate attempt to appropriate a missing past” (9-10), the post-modern mode of engaging with time constitutes a successful and creative strategy for preserving the past as well as a radical mode of dealing with a present past. The problem – if there is one – consists not in the “loss” or “lack” of historical time, but in an acute presence, actualization, and re-actualization of the past – precisely the realization of “the possibility of experiencing history in some active way” (11) (in this respect, it is significant, I believe, that “the archive” has become a dominant cultural metaphor in recent years). The result is, I would suggest, an intense sense of pastness-in-the-present, potentially amounting to a deferral of the present which, once internalized (the deferral), leads to an ontological (rather than ideological) shift in the experience of “liveness” towards a post-modern (necessarily technologically mediated) liveness/presence as ontology.
In my post today, I would like to interrogate Jameson’s contention about the move “beyond real historical time” (10) as distinctly characterizing postmodernism as well as the “nostalgia mode” (that paradoxically accompanies the first) as defining the postmodern experience of time. If deconstruction is indeed the postmodern strategy par excellence (which Jameson does not explicitly claim in this essay, however), then it appears to me – in light of Jameson’s argument – that the relation of postmodernism to time can be read in terms of the deconstruction of this category (which is a logical impossibility if we accept Kant’s proposition that time – just like space – is an a priori intuition). The result is, according to Jameson, a sense of intense present-ness, established and reinforced through pastiche – the mechanism that operates to ensure the cultural dominance of postmodernism.
In opposition to Jameson’s argument, I would suggest that, rather than a “desperate attempt to appropriate a missing past” (9-10), the post-modern mode of engaging with time constitutes a successful and creative strategy for preserving the past as well as a radical mode of dealing with a present past. The problem – if there is one – consists not in the “loss” or “lack” of historical time, but in an acute presence, actualization, and re-actualization of the past – precisely the realization of “the possibility of experiencing history in some active way” (11) (in this respect, it is significant, I believe, that “the archive” has become a dominant cultural metaphor in recent years). The result is, I would suggest, an intense sense of pastness-in-the-present, potentially amounting to a deferral of the present which, once internalized (the deferral), leads to an ontological (rather than ideological) shift in the experience of “liveness” towards a post-modern (necessarily technologically mediated) liveness/presence as ontology.
Revolution
"Transgression and violence [such as a real vs. "fake" hold up] are less serious, for they only contest the distribution of the real. Simulation is infinitely more dangerous since it always suggests, over and above its object, that law and order themselves might really be nothing more than a simulation." (Baudrillard, 180)
What Baudrillard appears to be saying here is that the nature of the simulacrum, since it alone is the truth and proves that there's nothing really beneath its depths, provides ample opportunity for the subversion of a system. Now, granted, Professor Doane mentioned today during lecture that postmodernism doesn't leave any room for subversion since there is no norm to be subverted, but I wondered if this, perhaps paradoxically, strengthens the idea of a lawless reality. For though there is no norm that can be subverted in postmodernism, people are always drawn into the system (would Baudrillard use the term 'ideology?'), the reality that is established by simulation. The question is, can they move outside it? Can they recognize simulation as a sign of a lack of truth and possibly take up arms against it? Is revolt a feasible possibility to Baudrillard? (It seems that way to me, but I'm not sure if such an argument was his intent.)
What Baudrillard appears to be saying here is that the nature of the simulacrum, since it alone is the truth and proves that there's nothing really beneath its depths, provides ample opportunity for the subversion of a system. Now, granted, Professor Doane mentioned today during lecture that postmodernism doesn't leave any room for subversion since there is no norm to be subverted, but I wondered if this, perhaps paradoxically, strengthens the idea of a lawless reality. For though there is no norm that can be subverted in postmodernism, people are always drawn into the system (would Baudrillard use the term 'ideology?'), the reality that is established by simulation. The question is, can they move outside it? Can they recognize simulation as a sign of a lack of truth and possibly take up arms against it? Is revolt a feasible possibility to Baudrillard? (It seems that way to me, but I'm not sure if such an argument was his intent.)
After today's lecture, I thought a lot about the artistic facets of Modernism and Post Modernism, particularly self-reference in Modern Art and appropriation in Post Modern Art, and further, the effect of these on the mediums chosen in each style. This made me see Modernism in the context of Levi-Strauss' concept of the engineer and Post Modernism in the context of the bricoleur.
Self-reference was central to the Modern Art movement, particularly in painting. Emphasis was placed on the materiality of the paint itself, and on the flatness of the surface of the canvas. The medium dictated the entire piece, and was anything but arbitrary. I interpret the foundations of this movement through the lens of the engineer. Tools are chosen (paint, flat canvas, etc.) specifically for each piece, highlighting the original use of each medium.
In contrast, appropriation and recyclability were central to the Post Modern Art movement. For example, Bob Perelman’s ‘China’ is made up of pre-existing sentences arranged to create a new piece, like the Readymades or Photomontages of the Dadaists. Perelman, like the bricoleur, depended upon resourcefulness to unearth tools that he could use, and created a work based on what he found.
Self-reference was central to the Modern Art movement, particularly in painting. Emphasis was placed on the materiality of the paint itself, and on the flatness of the surface of the canvas. The medium dictated the entire piece, and was anything but arbitrary. I interpret the foundations of this movement through the lens of the engineer. Tools are chosen (paint, flat canvas, etc.) specifically for each piece, highlighting the original use of each medium.
In contrast, appropriation and recyclability were central to the Post Modern Art movement. For example, Bob Perelman’s ‘China’ is made up of pre-existing sentences arranged to create a new piece, like the Readymades or Photomontages of the Dadaists. Perelman, like the bricoleur, depended upon resourcefulness to unearth tools that he could use, and created a work based on what he found.
Thursday, April 9, 2009
Butler: Image and Viewer
As many noted on their blog about the "image" analysis by Butler, I also found this very interesting and seemingly convincing. I agree with the Butler with her explanation on the relationship between the subject of an image and a viewer. Although the viewer is unrepresented in the image itself. The viewer's self, knowledge, experience, and emotion would take a great role in determining the subject of the image that he or she is looking at for him/herself. In this case, one's "being" takes a part of an agent in explaining the meaning and subject of an image.
I especially agree to Emily's blog with the application of Bulter's analysis to Benviniste's subjectivity. When I was reading Bulter, I also thought about the relationship between subjectivity and language "I".
I especially agree to Emily's blog with the application of Bulter's analysis to Benviniste's subjectivity. When I was reading Bulter, I also thought about the relationship between subjectivity and language "I".
I don't have an answer for Ioana's final question, but this question did get me thinking about the relationship between speech and the other, or, more specifically, between the term I and the face. Both of these cases seem to represent universal individuality. We learned how I, when spoken, refers to one specific person, a self-reference. Yet at the same time, everyone can use the exact same term, I, in reference to themselves making it mean something different in each case. I think that the face as a marker of absolute otherness parallels this example of I, yet in reverse:
Everyone has a different face, no matter what race, gender, etc., no two faces are exactly the same (I suppose we could get into the cases of identical twins, but let's not). However, each of these individual aspects of the self represent the other, a universal concept outside of oneself.
I think what I'm trying to get at is that while the term I represents a universal individuality, the face represents an individual universality.
Maybe I just didn't catch this in lecture today but in Butler's (and thus also Levinas’s) analysis of the face and the Other where does the desire to kill stem from? Is it an unconscious motivation that comes from "knowing" the Other? Or is it a more of conscious motivation due to difference and fear of this difference?
similar to the notion of "Science" for Althusser, Butler seems to require an objective reality that one might be able to get closer and closer to. according to her, pictures can point to a reality that they cannot represent and as such they could be the basis for a better ethics, compassion, or empathy or something better....
hmm...
sure they point to some reality, as do all representations, the only reality there is: the subjective mediated cages of ourselves. all societies create their own consciousness, can this consciousness really be "shocked" out of itself?
hmm...
sure they point to some reality, as do all representations, the only reality there is: the subjective mediated cages of ourselves. all societies create their own consciousness, can this consciousness really be "shocked" out of itself?
The Image and the Viewer
Skimming over Butler again, something caught my eye with regards to images and how they play into a relationship between the subject and the viewer of the image. Butler mentions on page 143 the ability for the "paradigmatically human" (she uses the examples of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden) to reside outside of the frame and that the viewer is "unrepresented" and not captured by the image; interpellation comes into play again, and in a sense this interpellation is... indirect isn't quite the right word, but the viewer is made exactly into that: someone who looks on without being represented, as Butler puts it. Yet this unrepresented viewer holds the power to "capture and subdue, if not eviscerate, the image at hand."
So if the viewer (and by extension the media) has this power over an image and how it is interpreted, I was wondering if how that image is handled (captured, subdued, eviscerated) by a given viewer can change over time--and if the fact that the subject of the image exists "outside the frame" plays a role in any change. Would such an alteration be contingent upon that subject, or could change in how the image is digested occur without that factor (which would perhaps mean a change in the viewer instead)? As Butler mentioned, the pictures of children dying from napalm during the Vietnam War that shocked Americans and moved them outrage; the public reaction shifted with time, but that itself was the result of a subject's change.
So if the viewer (and by extension the media) has this power over an image and how it is interpreted, I was wondering if how that image is handled (captured, subdued, eviscerated) by a given viewer can change over time--and if the fact that the subject of the image exists "outside the frame" plays a role in any change. Would such an alteration be contingent upon that subject, or could change in how the image is digested occur without that factor (which would perhaps mean a change in the viewer instead)? As Butler mentioned, the pictures of children dying from napalm during the Vietnam War that shocked Americans and moved them outrage; the public reaction shifted with time, but that itself was the result of a subject's change.
“Orientalism”/”Negritude”
Despite the use of different strategies (partially derived from different legacies of thought, apparently), it seems that there is a (structural) parallelism between the modes in which both “Orientalism” and “Negritude” come into “being”: in/through discourse. The similarity of the mechanism(s) is striking.
Given the (I’d call it) “performative” dimension of discourse (discourse produces “truth”), isn’t there a danger in outlining / throwing into discourse the (potentially “true”) mechanism of the coming into “being” of “Orientalism” and “Negritude”? Isn’t there the danger that this throwing into discourse (through theorizing) might actually have a conservative effect?
The Ethical and the Linguistic
“That situation is one in which we are addressed, in which the other directs language towards us.” (Butler, 139)
As the ethical arises – in Levinas’s model (undertaken by Butler, as well) – as a function of the (linguistic) situation (“language arrives at an address we do not will” – Butler, 139; we cannot control the flow and directionality of the language we temporarily appropriate), apparently independently of the content of what is being said – which I see as being a function of the speaker (the human being), Levinasian ethics appears to me to paradoxically bracket the self in order to capture the mechanism of the “purely” ethical (indebted as it appears to be in structuralism, though transcending it). For, “to be addressed is to be, from the start, deprived of will” (Butler, 139).
The ethical gesture is a negative one, I would suggest: an act of censorship. Levinas’ is a negative ethics.
In light of : A different light
In Sensibility and the Face, Levinas operates an incredibly fascinating mutation within the binary light-obscurity (ultimately reducible to the binary presence-absence): obscurity as presence filling the space and emptied by the light – “The light makes the thing appear by driving out the shadows: it empties space. It makes space arise specifically as void.” (Levinas ,189) (contrast with Plotin, for example: obscurity is nothing but the absence of light). This shift entails – in my view – a reconfiguration of presence as potentiality of the absence – presence in a new light (or a new concept of presence?), corresponding perhaps – again, in my view – to a new ideology of liveness emerging/dominating on the contemporary stage.
The Impossibility of the Same
Even though I find Levinas philosophy qua ethics superb, I believe that it is “idealistic” (in the “common”/everyday use of the word; for Levinas, “idealism is refused” – 216) in that it grows (beautifully) out of the assumption that the Same is actuality. I would argue, however, that, as there can be no identity without difference (as Butler also notes), there can neither be the Same. The self as the other is the actuality (thus existence is performance) that – it seems – neither Levinas nor Butler takes into account.
“Speech proceeds from absolute difference.” (Levinas, 194)
“The formal structure of language thereby announces the ethical inviolability of the Other and, without any odor of the "numinous", his "holiness”. (Levinas, 195)
Is language the “cause”/source/origin/condition of/for the absolute in-acccessibility of the other?
Despite the use of different strategies (partially derived from different legacies of thought, apparently), it seems that there is a (structural) parallelism between the modes in which both “Orientalism” and “Negritude” come into “being”: in/through discourse. The similarity of the mechanism(s) is striking.
Given the (I’d call it) “performative” dimension of discourse (discourse produces “truth”), isn’t there a danger in outlining / throwing into discourse the (potentially “true”) mechanism of the coming into “being” of “Orientalism” and “Negritude”? Isn’t there the danger that this throwing into discourse (through theorizing) might actually have a conservative effect?
The Ethical and the Linguistic
“That situation is one in which we are addressed, in which the other directs language towards us.” (Butler, 139)
As the ethical arises – in Levinas’s model (undertaken by Butler, as well) – as a function of the (linguistic) situation (“language arrives at an address we do not will” – Butler, 139; we cannot control the flow and directionality of the language we temporarily appropriate), apparently independently of the content of what is being said – which I see as being a function of the speaker (the human being), Levinasian ethics appears to me to paradoxically bracket the self in order to capture the mechanism of the “purely” ethical (indebted as it appears to be in structuralism, though transcending it). For, “to be addressed is to be, from the start, deprived of will” (Butler, 139).
The ethical gesture is a negative one, I would suggest: an act of censorship. Levinas’ is a negative ethics.
In light of : A different light
In Sensibility and the Face, Levinas operates an incredibly fascinating mutation within the binary light-obscurity (ultimately reducible to the binary presence-absence): obscurity as presence filling the space and emptied by the light – “The light makes the thing appear by driving out the shadows: it empties space. It makes space arise specifically as void.” (Levinas ,189) (contrast with Plotin, for example: obscurity is nothing but the absence of light). This shift entails – in my view – a reconfiguration of presence as potentiality of the absence – presence in a new light (or a new concept of presence?), corresponding perhaps – again, in my view – to a new ideology of liveness emerging/dominating on the contemporary stage.
The Impossibility of the Same
Even though I find Levinas philosophy qua ethics superb, I believe that it is “idealistic” (in the “common”/everyday use of the word; for Levinas, “idealism is refused” – 216) in that it grows (beautifully) out of the assumption that the Same is actuality. I would argue, however, that, as there can be no identity without difference (as Butler also notes), there can neither be the Same. The self as the other is the actuality (thus existence is performance) that – it seems – neither Levinas nor Butler takes into account.
“Speech proceeds from absolute difference.” (Levinas, 194)
“The formal structure of language thereby announces the ethical inviolability of the Other and, without any odor of the "numinous", his "holiness”. (Levinas, 195)
Is language the “cause”/source/origin/condition of/for the absolute in-acccessibility of the other?
Friday, April 3, 2009
Doane claims that for Marx value is based on a purely social social system of exchange. I am unclear why the word "social" is used. In order to put an exchange value on something, Marx believes one must see the commodity in relation to other commodities which consequentially transforms the commodity into the form of signification. The attribution of value to each and every commodity in relation to another, however, seems subjective, individualistic, and far from social. Is it social in the sense that relationships between objects are solely based on human labor to create these objects? Is it social in the sense that the reliance on signification over the commodity itself has become a popular mainstay in the general public? Marx has the idea that the process is based on social value, yet he goes on to claim that the result is a concealment of human contact. The relations between people abiding by the process therefore seem to be the antithesis of "social". Can the phenomenon of exchange value be called social when people become alienated from one another when following it?
Lecture on March 31
I would like to comment how Marxism seemed to be straightforward compared to other essays. At the first time when I was just reading the essay, it was very comprehensible, maybe implying that what Marx is proposing makes logical sense for me. I especially found his articulate definition of commodity at the beginning of his essay intriguing. As Emily notes in her blog, I found a strong connection between commodity and prostitution as a kind of social exchange.
Thursday, April 2, 2009
I found the Ideological State Apparatuses that Althusser notes to be very similar to the types of dominant discursive bodies that Foucault notes in History of Sexuality, Vol. 1. It was intriguing to read that they are described as working in similar ways, with reproduction of dominant discourses being sifted through them concerning ways to "act properly" in society; in this case how to act properly economically and sexuality, respectively.
The most interesting part of Two or Three Things I Know About Her for me was the role commodity played in the movie. This is mostly because it wasn't immediately apparent for me until Prof. Doane's lecture on Tuesday. The role of prostitution in the movie, and in any society, seems to me to be the ultimate form of commodity exchange. One can argue that in an environment of constant and fluid exchange, the only entity one truly and irrevocably possesses is one's own body. Prostitution is so extreme because it means giving that one thing up in exchange for goods of necessarily lesser value.
The context of prostitution in Godard's movie also played an important role in the sub-text of commodity exchange throughout. This prostitution was not occurring on the street, but in fact between men and married, suburban, middle-class women in organized brothels, emphasizing the fact that every part of a capitalist society is based on exchange, however extreme it may be.
There was a quote at one point in the movie, I don't remember it exactly but it was something about cities being forms existing in space. I was reminded of this quote during Godard's final shot of the products on the lawn: they were simply forms existing in space. I interpreted this to mean that cities are made up of nothing more than commodities themselves.
Bricolage puts in another appearance
"Ideology... is for Marx an imaginary assemblage (bricolage), a pure dream, empty and vain, constituted by the 'day's residues' from the only full and positive reality, that of the concrete history of concrete material individuals materially producing their existence." (Althusser, 160)
What does Althusser mean here? I find it odd that he (or maybe it's more accurate to say Marx) describes ideology as "empty and vain" while he simultaneously conflates it with a concept that, according to Derrida, ought to be in charge of language's construction.* Perhaps Althusser (again, is it more or less accurate to say Marx?) is referring to the fact that ideology is ahistorical, and bricolage itself is an originating force, and that they are both arbitrary in their own constructions. Yet it still strikes me as peculiar that he describes them as "empty" and "null," if only because that use of diction almost implies to me a lack of power, something which I don't think applies to ideology/bricolage at all. I don't think Althusser, by any stretch of the imagination, is saying that ideology lacks power, but I feel (and I admit, it's probably nothing more than a knee-jerk reaction on my part) as if his language unintentionally trivializes the two concepts.
(*Based on this, I think Ioana's question about ideology=the unconscious=language, at least on the grounds of their structure, is an astute observation, and I agree with her that it does appear to be the case.)
What does Althusser mean here? I find it odd that he (or maybe it's more accurate to say Marx) describes ideology as "empty and vain" while he simultaneously conflates it with a concept that, according to Derrida, ought to be in charge of language's construction.* Perhaps Althusser (again, is it more or less accurate to say Marx?) is referring to the fact that ideology is ahistorical, and bricolage itself is an originating force, and that they are both arbitrary in their own constructions. Yet it still strikes me as peculiar that he describes them as "empty" and "null," if only because that use of diction almost implies to me a lack of power, something which I don't think applies to ideology/bricolage at all. I don't think Althusser, by any stretch of the imagination, is saying that ideology lacks power, but I feel (and I admit, it's probably nothing more than a knee-jerk reaction on my part) as if his language unintentionally trivializes the two concepts.
(*Based on this, I think Ioana's question about ideology=the unconscious=language, at least on the grounds of their structure, is an astute observation, and I agree with her that it does appear to be the case.)
Marx and Althusser’s Ideologies
Observation:
Based on this week’s readings from Marx and Althusser (put in relation, of course, with previous readings for this class), I reached the conclusion that a shift/transfer to metaphysics in one form or another at a certain point in the arguments is necessary for the consistency and satisfactory operation of the (arguably “cultural”) theories put forth (by the thinkers under scrutiny).
Interrogations:
In continuation to my observation above – serving as an introduction to my response, I will structure my post as a series of interrogations:
1) Does Marx’s project consist in the recuperation of the centrality and uniqueness of the use-value within a necessarily modified society (and a transformed infrastructure, perhaps)? What is at stake in the denunciation of the naturalization of the process of exchange?
2) The reference to “the magic of money” as well as the inversion in causal relation that Marx posits in the conclusion of his chapter on “Commodities” in The Capital is particularly intriguing, in my view: “What appears to happen is not that a particular commodity becomes money because all the other commodities express their values in it, but, on the contrary, that all other commodities universally express their values in a particular commodity because it is money.” (Marx, 187).
On account of this, money is – to use Althusser’s formulation – “always already”, just like Althusser’s ideology and condition of subject(ivity), or like Foucault’s “p(/P)ower”. Even though an avowedly social construct in Marx’s theory of the commodities, money becomes, I would argue, a metaphysical concept that holds the argument together. It is at this point (in his account of money), I believe, that Marx makes the – unacknowledged – move to metaphysics in this chapter (just as Althusser makes the move to metaphysics when he claims that “individuals are always-already subjects” – 176, that the existence of ideology precedes all existence).
3) It strikes me that both Marx and Althusser – in contrast to structuralist and poststructuralist thinkers – appear to leave the concept of reality intact (though hardly ever accessible). This assumption gets complicated, however, (at least in Althusser), when he (Althusser) asserts “the effective presence of a new reality: ideology” (133). If ideology becomes “reality”/ “obviousness” – and is experienced as such – then what is the point in denouncing it as a fake/fraud? However fascinating I find Althusser’s argument to be (just like Spinoza’s about human freedom – which I believe Althusser’s theory is a version of and about which I asked myself the same question), I cannot help asking what is the point in the denunciation of ideology as a sort of fake. At the point of conversion in “obviousness”, ideology becomes ontology, in my view.
4) For Freud, the unconscious is endowed with a structure; for Lacan, the unconscious is structured like a language. For Althusser, ideology is “exactly like the unconscious” (Althusser, 161) in that it is “eternal”. Does this mean that ideology is structured as a language? (it appears to me that it does).
5) Prof. Doane referred in her lecture to Althusser’s strategy of introducing the discursive realm of “s(/S)cience” in opposition to ideology as a means of giving consistency to his theory about Ideology and the State. If Althusser’s theory is supposed to belong to science, is this also true of Marx’s philosophy that Althusser re-reads or does (“vulgar”) Marxism – in the final analysis – belong to Ideology?
Moreover, Althusser puts forth a new theory of t(/T)heory, on account of which he calls for the “supersession” of the descriptive theory of the State that Marxism proposes (138). To what extent is this “supersession” also a suppression (of Marxism to make room for the Althusserian theory)?
Based on this week’s readings from Marx and Althusser (put in relation, of course, with previous readings for this class), I reached the conclusion that a shift/transfer to metaphysics in one form or another at a certain point in the arguments is necessary for the consistency and satisfactory operation of the (arguably “cultural”) theories put forth (by the thinkers under scrutiny).
Interrogations:
In continuation to my observation above – serving as an introduction to my response, I will structure my post as a series of interrogations:
1) Does Marx’s project consist in the recuperation of the centrality and uniqueness of the use-value within a necessarily modified society (and a transformed infrastructure, perhaps)? What is at stake in the denunciation of the naturalization of the process of exchange?
2) The reference to “the magic of money” as well as the inversion in causal relation that Marx posits in the conclusion of his chapter on “Commodities” in The Capital is particularly intriguing, in my view: “What appears to happen is not that a particular commodity becomes money because all the other commodities express their values in it, but, on the contrary, that all other commodities universally express their values in a particular commodity because it is money.” (Marx, 187).
On account of this, money is – to use Althusser’s formulation – “always already”, just like Althusser’s ideology and condition of subject(ivity), or like Foucault’s “p(/P)ower”. Even though an avowedly social construct in Marx’s theory of the commodities, money becomes, I would argue, a metaphysical concept that holds the argument together. It is at this point (in his account of money), I believe, that Marx makes the – unacknowledged – move to metaphysics in this chapter (just as Althusser makes the move to metaphysics when he claims that “individuals are always-already subjects” – 176, that the existence of ideology precedes all existence).
3) It strikes me that both Marx and Althusser – in contrast to structuralist and poststructuralist thinkers – appear to leave the concept of reality intact (though hardly ever accessible). This assumption gets complicated, however, (at least in Althusser), when he (Althusser) asserts “the effective presence of a new reality: ideology” (133). If ideology becomes “reality”/ “obviousness” – and is experienced as such – then what is the point in denouncing it as a fake/fraud? However fascinating I find Althusser’s argument to be (just like Spinoza’s about human freedom – which I believe Althusser’s theory is a version of and about which I asked myself the same question), I cannot help asking what is the point in the denunciation of ideology as a sort of fake. At the point of conversion in “obviousness”, ideology becomes ontology, in my view.
4) For Freud, the unconscious is endowed with a structure; for Lacan, the unconscious is structured like a language. For Althusser, ideology is “exactly like the unconscious” (Althusser, 161) in that it is “eternal”. Does this mean that ideology is structured as a language? (it appears to me that it does).
5) Prof. Doane referred in her lecture to Althusser’s strategy of introducing the discursive realm of “s(/S)cience” in opposition to ideology as a means of giving consistency to his theory about Ideology and the State. If Althusser’s theory is supposed to belong to science, is this also true of Marx’s philosophy that Althusser re-reads or does (“vulgar”) Marxism – in the final analysis – belong to Ideology?
Moreover, Althusser puts forth a new theory of t(/T)heory, on account of which he calls for the “supersession” of the descriptive theory of the State that Marxism proposes (138). To what extent is this “supersession” also a suppression (of Marxism to make room for the Althusserian theory)?
p.178:
"...we should note that all this 'procedure' to set up Christian religious subjects is dominated by a strange phenomenon: the fact that there can only be such a multitude of possible religious subjects on the absolute condition that there is a Unique, Absolute, Other Subject, i.e. God."
In this passage, Althusser is discussing the methodology by which the Christian religious ideology takes hold on its subjects. When I first read this, I didn't quite understand why he felt it necessary to include this notion in his classification. He goes on to describe a "conversation" between God and Moses, in which God states "I am that I am."
This notion of a direct interpellation to Moses by God seems, in a way, contradictorily assigned. If the subject recognizes, as Moses does, that he is a subject of and for "the Subject", then the notion of ideology beyond the conscious mind is greatly diminished. It appears that the unconscious ideology, at least in the Christian religious context, becomes more of a conscious "mission" with established goals, created and maintained by the Subject. Althusser argues that each subject "can contemplate its own image (present and future)" (p.180), yet to what level is the ideology responsible for this notion of interdependence? If the ideology is dependent on this Other Subject, who has absolute authority, then how could this same ideology produce subjects with autonomy? If the ideology is in fact instilled in the subjects in this manner of brute recognition, then how could one call it an ideology instead of simply a "world-view"?
"...we should note that all this 'procedure' to set up Christian religious subjects is dominated by a strange phenomenon: the fact that there can only be such a multitude of possible religious subjects on the absolute condition that there is a Unique, Absolute, Other Subject, i.e. God."
In this passage, Althusser is discussing the methodology by which the Christian religious ideology takes hold on its subjects. When I first read this, I didn't quite understand why he felt it necessary to include this notion in his classification. He goes on to describe a "conversation" between God and Moses, in which God states "I am that I am."
This notion of a direct interpellation to Moses by God seems, in a way, contradictorily assigned. If the subject recognizes, as Moses does, that he is a subject of and for "the Subject", then the notion of ideology beyond the conscious mind is greatly diminished. It appears that the unconscious ideology, at least in the Christian religious context, becomes more of a conscious "mission" with established goals, created and maintained by the Subject. Althusser argues that each subject "can contemplate its own image (present and future)" (p.180), yet to what level is the ideology responsible for this notion of interdependence? If the ideology is dependent on this Other Subject, who has absolute authority, then how could this same ideology produce subjects with autonomy? If the ideology is in fact instilled in the subjects in this manner of brute recognition, then how could one call it an ideology instead of simply a "world-view"?
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