"What does it mean to be subject to desubjectification?" (142).
I particularly responded to this Agamben quote questioning peoples' ability to assume the "vacant place" of the subject when they have lost the self-identity necessary to be a subject. The very fact that the place, however, is referred to as "vacant" produces a sentiment of emptiness, much like the individual himself. Can an empty person assume an empty position? For Agamben, the empty person or the "muselmann" loses touch with reality and therefore cannot act as a witness to himself or utilize the "I" shifter. As mentioned in lecture, Agamben opposes the idea that in order to be human, language must be employed as he believes this idea would exclude the musselmann from humanity. By believing the musselmann cannot perceive himself fully and will consequentially fall prey to desubjectification, Agamben also excludes the muselmann from humanity--to what degree is a "subject" solely a tangible being and to what degree is a "subject" the ability to use "I"?
Friday, April 24, 2009
Thursday, April 23, 2009
Similar Image or Semblance Image
"The image is neither nothing, nor all, nor is it one--it is not even two. It is deployed according to the minimum complexity supposed by two points of view that confront each other under the gaze of a third" (152).
This quote comes from the beginning of Didi-Huberman's work. As I was starting the essay, I was surprised that I read the specific sentence more than 3 times. Even after doing so, I was still confused and unsure about what he meant. However, the photos illustrated in the later parts of his work definitely help me better understand. During the lecture on Thursday, I found Professor Doane's explanation interesting and very helpful. As Ryan notes in his post, it seems necessary for a photo image that the image needs associable events to "augment" meaning of the image.
This quote comes from the beginning of Didi-Huberman's work. As I was starting the essay, I was surprised that I read the specific sentence more than 3 times. Even after doing so, I was still confused and unsure about what he meant. However, the photos illustrated in the later parts of his work definitely help me better understand. During the lecture on Thursday, I found Professor Doane's explanation interesting and very helpful. As Ryan notes in his post, it seems necessary for a photo image that the image needs associable events to "augment" meaning of the image.
I found Prof. Doane's lecture on the 4 images that Didi-Huberman presents and analyzes to be extremely intriguing, especially when juxtaposed with the cropped picture of the women running to the gas chambers. It raises the question to me of if images can represent events due to their extreme changeability; the cropped image loses the traces of risk involved in taking them, thus changing the event in a sense that the photos are trying to represent. While both photo images picture a scene in a larger context, by cropping the photo, the meaning seems to change. Which in my mind suggests that images alone cannot solely represent events such as the Holocaust. More context is needed to augment the images.
"According to the law that what man despises is also what he fears resembles him, the Muselmann is universally avoided because everyone in the camp recognizes himself in his disfigured face." (Agamben, 52)
Something triggered in my memory when I came to this line, and I realized that it reminded me of Freud's Oedipus complex as discussed, I believe, in "The Uncanny." In both of these instances, a human subjected to marginalization by a greater force at power (the woman and the Muselmann) appears to another being as inferior to a degree; the woman has been conquered by castration, the Muselmann has been denigrated as a non-being unable to experience neither life nor death. But doesn't Freud view his concept of the uncanny as a return to an earlier state of things, even a return to death? Does a man, when confronted with the Muselmann, seek a return at all in that vein?
Something triggered in my memory when I came to this line, and I realized that it reminded me of Freud's Oedipus complex as discussed, I believe, in "The Uncanny." In both of these instances, a human subjected to marginalization by a greater force at power (the woman and the Muselmann) appears to another being as inferior to a degree; the woman has been conquered by castration, the Muselmann has been denigrated as a non-being unable to experience neither life nor death. But doesn't Freud view his concept of the uncanny as a return to an earlier state of things, even a return to death? Does a man, when confronted with the Muselmann, seek a return at all in that vein?
1. Didi-Huberman discusses the Holocaust as an event beyond human interpretation or imagination; the destruction was something entirely incomprehensible to us beyond statistics and death tolls.
2. The sublime, according to Lyotard, is "when the imagination fails to present an object which might, if only in principle, come to match a concept" (What is Postmodernism?, p. 78). He goes on to say that "[ideas about the sublime] impart no knowledge about reality..." (78).
Does this mean that (a) the Holocaust was a sublime event? and (b) that it cannot be considered reality or history from which we can learn?
2. The sublime, according to Lyotard, is "when the imagination fails to present an object which might, if only in principle, come to match a concept" (What is Postmodernism?, p. 78). He goes on to say that "[ideas about the sublime] impart no knowledge about reality..." (78).
Does this mean that (a) the Holocaust was a sublime event? and (b) that it cannot be considered reality or history from which we can learn?
A Re-turn that is not a Return
I will begin by expressing my delight at the gesture towards an apparent return to the real and to the human in the texts assigned for this week and my up-set at the realization that this gesture is performed in light of tragedies that marked the human and (so) real history.
Yet, I note that this (apparent) “return” involves not a bracketing or absolute denial of structuralism or poststructuralism (or postmodernism) but a full embracing and completion of it: both Agamben and Didi-Huberman have learned the lessons of difference “(or to borrow Derrida’s coinage) (of) differences” (Didi-Huberman, 121) and of the annihilation of “the One” (totality) – thus, Didi-Huberman calls for “multiple singularities always susceptible to differences, or to differances” (121) while Agamben sees himself as bringing to completion the work of Benveniste and Foucault. In this sense, Agamben’s and Didi-Huberman’s moves represent not a return, but ,rather, a re-turn.
I also observe that both Agamben and Didi-Huberman ground their theories in the reference to exceptional events that recently marked human history (Auschwitz), (re-)turning to that which has been designated as the un-representable and, thus, realizing Lyotard’s concluding demands in the Manifesto for/about a Post-Modern condition: “Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unrepresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the name.” (Lyotard, 82)
Lastly, I reflect on the impossibility to see and to speak about “that which remains unspoken”/unseen (to extrapolate and “adjust” Wittgenstein) that both thinkers refer to in the readings for this week. In Didi-Huberman’s case, this impossibility is formulated in terms of “that which remains inaccessible as an all” (p. 138). For Agamben, the impossibility is conceptualized as the impossibility to bear witness (which, nevertheless, becomes a possibility with the figure of the Muselmann).
I propose that in order to fill the “lacunas” that these two undertakings of a re-turn open and confront with, a re-turn to and of metaphysics is necessary.
Yet, I note that this (apparent) “return” involves not a bracketing or absolute denial of structuralism or poststructuralism (or postmodernism) but a full embracing and completion of it: both Agamben and Didi-Huberman have learned the lessons of difference “(or to borrow Derrida’s coinage) (of) differences” (Didi-Huberman, 121) and of the annihilation of “the One” (totality) – thus, Didi-Huberman calls for “multiple singularities always susceptible to differences, or to differances” (121) while Agamben sees himself as bringing to completion the work of Benveniste and Foucault. In this sense, Agamben’s and Didi-Huberman’s moves represent not a return, but ,rather, a re-turn.
I also observe that both Agamben and Didi-Huberman ground their theories in the reference to exceptional events that recently marked human history (Auschwitz), (re-)turning to that which has been designated as the un-representable and, thus, realizing Lyotard’s concluding demands in the Manifesto for/about a Post-Modern condition: “Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unrepresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the name.” (Lyotard, 82)
Lastly, I reflect on the impossibility to see and to speak about “that which remains unspoken”/unseen (to extrapolate and “adjust” Wittgenstein) that both thinkers refer to in the readings for this week. In Didi-Huberman’s case, this impossibility is formulated in terms of “that which remains inaccessible as an all” (p. 138). For Agamben, the impossibility is conceptualized as the impossibility to bear witness (which, nevertheless, becomes a possibility with the figure of the Muselmann).
I propose that in order to fill the “lacunas” that these two undertakings of a re-turn open and confront with, a re-turn to and of metaphysics is necessary.
Didi-Huberman says, "lanzman thinks that no image is capable of "saying" that history, which is why he tirelessly films the witnesses' speech. Godard thinks that henceforth all images will speak to us only of that history (but to say that "they speak of it" does not mean that they "say it", which is why he tirelessly reexamines our entire visual culture in light of this question......They boldly mix the historical archive--which is omnipresent--with the artistic repertoire of world cinema. they show a lot, they make a montage of everything with everything. so a certain suspicion arises: the suspicion that they are lying about everything."
this reminds me of Minh-ha's narration of Reassemblage when she says something to the effect that she doesn't intend to speak about the people but rather, to speak near by the people. the ethnographic context of that documentary (if we can agree to classify at all) is the discourse of the other and the impossibility of understanding the other, which inherently is our inability to represent other. given that thought, how is it that the process transcends the inability of the medium? why is the process less problematic than the representation itself? can ethics be a medium?
this reminds me of Minh-ha's narration of Reassemblage when she says something to the effect that she doesn't intend to speak about the people but rather, to speak near by the people. the ethnographic context of that documentary (if we can agree to classify at all) is the discourse of the other and the impossibility of understanding the other, which inherently is our inability to represent other. given that thought, how is it that the process transcends the inability of the medium? why is the process less problematic than the representation itself? can ethics be a medium?
Friday, April 17, 2009
Hyperreal and Imaginary
"Disneyland imaginary is neither true or false: it is a deterrence machine set up in order to rejuvenate in reverse the fiction of the real" (175).
Jean Baudrillard argues that Disneyland presents what are very realistic, but fake reality as imaginary. While presenting its imaginary features, it allows people to differentiate between reality and imaginary: people would believe, he claims, that Disneyland is imaginary and that the surroundings of Disneyland are real. However, Baudrillard makes his argument more interesting by asserting that "in fact all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real" (175). I found this example very intriguing, for it well explained what masks the absence of a besic reality.
Jean Baudrillard argues that Disneyland presents what are very realistic, but fake reality as imaginary. While presenting its imaginary features, it allows people to differentiate between reality and imaginary: people would believe, he claims, that Disneyland is imaginary and that the surroundings of Disneyland are real. However, Baudrillard makes his argument more interesting by asserting that "in fact all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real" (175). I found this example very intriguing, for it well explained what masks the absence of a besic reality.
Thursday, April 16, 2009
In Jameson's writing on post-structuralism, I question whether he is referring to the physical, the psychological, or both. For instance, he claims that post-modernism relies on the idea of borrowing and recycling from the past yet he also believes that a post-modern product is rooted in the present and contains no history. Do the actions of borrowing and recycling result only within physical space? If such is the case, is it the psychological state that inhibits the past? Which state is responsible for post-modernism? For Jameson, post-modernism is fragmented (In the physical and psychological? In the past and the present? In the idea of mixed media?) yet also flat. Is postmodernism fragmented in the sense of aesthetics? It seems that if the period were to be fragmented in the sense of the psychological, post-modernism would hardly be depthless or flat.
the representation of representation, or the image of an image, presents an interesting discourse in Baudrillard text, yet not entirely new. why is it that modern media affords the fodder for this kind of discourse and not age old gossip, or image? humans have always represented the world around them, why is it that this age of representation presents a whole new world? Can the nature of television and immediacy or the loss of distance really change our landscape this radically?
Towards a Post-Modern Sense of Time/Presence
“the breakdown of temporality suddenly releases this present of time from all the activities and the intentionalities that might focus it and make it a space of praxis; thereby isolated, that present suddenly engulfs the subject with undescribable vividness, a materiality of perception properly overwhelming, which effectively dramatizes the power of the material – better still, the literal – Signifier in isolation.” (Jameson, 13-4)
In my post today, I would like to interrogate Jameson’s contention about the move “beyond real historical time” (10) as distinctly characterizing postmodernism as well as the “nostalgia mode” (that paradoxically accompanies the first) as defining the postmodern experience of time. If deconstruction is indeed the postmodern strategy par excellence (which Jameson does not explicitly claim in this essay, however), then it appears to me – in light of Jameson’s argument – that the relation of postmodernism to time can be read in terms of the deconstruction of this category (which is a logical impossibility if we accept Kant’s proposition that time – just like space – is an a priori intuition). The result is, according to Jameson, a sense of intense present-ness, established and reinforced through pastiche – the mechanism that operates to ensure the cultural dominance of postmodernism.
In opposition to Jameson’s argument, I would suggest that, rather than a “desperate attempt to appropriate a missing past” (9-10), the post-modern mode of engaging with time constitutes a successful and creative strategy for preserving the past as well as a radical mode of dealing with a present past. The problem – if there is one – consists not in the “loss” or “lack” of historical time, but in an acute presence, actualization, and re-actualization of the past – precisely the realization of “the possibility of experiencing history in some active way” (11) (in this respect, it is significant, I believe, that “the archive” has become a dominant cultural metaphor in recent years). The result is, I would suggest, an intense sense of pastness-in-the-present, potentially amounting to a deferral of the present which, once internalized (the deferral), leads to an ontological (rather than ideological) shift in the experience of “liveness” towards a post-modern (necessarily technologically mediated) liveness/presence as ontology.
In my post today, I would like to interrogate Jameson’s contention about the move “beyond real historical time” (10) as distinctly characterizing postmodernism as well as the “nostalgia mode” (that paradoxically accompanies the first) as defining the postmodern experience of time. If deconstruction is indeed the postmodern strategy par excellence (which Jameson does not explicitly claim in this essay, however), then it appears to me – in light of Jameson’s argument – that the relation of postmodernism to time can be read in terms of the deconstruction of this category (which is a logical impossibility if we accept Kant’s proposition that time – just like space – is an a priori intuition). The result is, according to Jameson, a sense of intense present-ness, established and reinforced through pastiche – the mechanism that operates to ensure the cultural dominance of postmodernism.
In opposition to Jameson’s argument, I would suggest that, rather than a “desperate attempt to appropriate a missing past” (9-10), the post-modern mode of engaging with time constitutes a successful and creative strategy for preserving the past as well as a radical mode of dealing with a present past. The problem – if there is one – consists not in the “loss” or “lack” of historical time, but in an acute presence, actualization, and re-actualization of the past – precisely the realization of “the possibility of experiencing history in some active way” (11) (in this respect, it is significant, I believe, that “the archive” has become a dominant cultural metaphor in recent years). The result is, I would suggest, an intense sense of pastness-in-the-present, potentially amounting to a deferral of the present which, once internalized (the deferral), leads to an ontological (rather than ideological) shift in the experience of “liveness” towards a post-modern (necessarily technologically mediated) liveness/presence as ontology.
Revolution
"Transgression and violence [such as a real vs. "fake" hold up] are less serious, for they only contest the distribution of the real. Simulation is infinitely more dangerous since it always suggests, over and above its object, that law and order themselves might really be nothing more than a simulation." (Baudrillard, 180)
What Baudrillard appears to be saying here is that the nature of the simulacrum, since it alone is the truth and proves that there's nothing really beneath its depths, provides ample opportunity for the subversion of a system. Now, granted, Professor Doane mentioned today during lecture that postmodernism doesn't leave any room for subversion since there is no norm to be subverted, but I wondered if this, perhaps paradoxically, strengthens the idea of a lawless reality. For though there is no norm that can be subverted in postmodernism, people are always drawn into the system (would Baudrillard use the term 'ideology?'), the reality that is established by simulation. The question is, can they move outside it? Can they recognize simulation as a sign of a lack of truth and possibly take up arms against it? Is revolt a feasible possibility to Baudrillard? (It seems that way to me, but I'm not sure if such an argument was his intent.)
What Baudrillard appears to be saying here is that the nature of the simulacrum, since it alone is the truth and proves that there's nothing really beneath its depths, provides ample opportunity for the subversion of a system. Now, granted, Professor Doane mentioned today during lecture that postmodernism doesn't leave any room for subversion since there is no norm to be subverted, but I wondered if this, perhaps paradoxically, strengthens the idea of a lawless reality. For though there is no norm that can be subverted in postmodernism, people are always drawn into the system (would Baudrillard use the term 'ideology?'), the reality that is established by simulation. The question is, can they move outside it? Can they recognize simulation as a sign of a lack of truth and possibly take up arms against it? Is revolt a feasible possibility to Baudrillard? (It seems that way to me, but I'm not sure if such an argument was his intent.)
After today's lecture, I thought a lot about the artistic facets of Modernism and Post Modernism, particularly self-reference in Modern Art and appropriation in Post Modern Art, and further, the effect of these on the mediums chosen in each style. This made me see Modernism in the context of Levi-Strauss' concept of the engineer and Post Modernism in the context of the bricoleur.
Self-reference was central to the Modern Art movement, particularly in painting. Emphasis was placed on the materiality of the paint itself, and on the flatness of the surface of the canvas. The medium dictated the entire piece, and was anything but arbitrary. I interpret the foundations of this movement through the lens of the engineer. Tools are chosen (paint, flat canvas, etc.) specifically for each piece, highlighting the original use of each medium.
In contrast, appropriation and recyclability were central to the Post Modern Art movement. For example, Bob Perelman’s ‘China’ is made up of pre-existing sentences arranged to create a new piece, like the Readymades or Photomontages of the Dadaists. Perelman, like the bricoleur, depended upon resourcefulness to unearth tools that he could use, and created a work based on what he found.
Self-reference was central to the Modern Art movement, particularly in painting. Emphasis was placed on the materiality of the paint itself, and on the flatness of the surface of the canvas. The medium dictated the entire piece, and was anything but arbitrary. I interpret the foundations of this movement through the lens of the engineer. Tools are chosen (paint, flat canvas, etc.) specifically for each piece, highlighting the original use of each medium.
In contrast, appropriation and recyclability were central to the Post Modern Art movement. For example, Bob Perelman’s ‘China’ is made up of pre-existing sentences arranged to create a new piece, like the Readymades or Photomontages of the Dadaists. Perelman, like the bricoleur, depended upon resourcefulness to unearth tools that he could use, and created a work based on what he found.
Thursday, April 9, 2009
Butler: Image and Viewer
As many noted on their blog about the "image" analysis by Butler, I also found this very interesting and seemingly convincing. I agree with the Butler with her explanation on the relationship between the subject of an image and a viewer. Although the viewer is unrepresented in the image itself. The viewer's self, knowledge, experience, and emotion would take a great role in determining the subject of the image that he or she is looking at for him/herself. In this case, one's "being" takes a part of an agent in explaining the meaning and subject of an image.
I especially agree to Emily's blog with the application of Bulter's analysis to Benviniste's subjectivity. When I was reading Bulter, I also thought about the relationship between subjectivity and language "I".
I especially agree to Emily's blog with the application of Bulter's analysis to Benviniste's subjectivity. When I was reading Bulter, I also thought about the relationship between subjectivity and language "I".
I don't have an answer for Ioana's final question, but this question did get me thinking about the relationship between speech and the other, or, more specifically, between the term I and the face. Both of these cases seem to represent universal individuality. We learned how I, when spoken, refers to one specific person, a self-reference. Yet at the same time, everyone can use the exact same term, I, in reference to themselves making it mean something different in each case. I think that the face as a marker of absolute otherness parallels this example of I, yet in reverse:
Everyone has a different face, no matter what race, gender, etc., no two faces are exactly the same (I suppose we could get into the cases of identical twins, but let's not). However, each of these individual aspects of the self represent the other, a universal concept outside of oneself.
I think what I'm trying to get at is that while the term I represents a universal individuality, the face represents an individual universality.
Maybe I just didn't catch this in lecture today but in Butler's (and thus also Levinas’s) analysis of the face and the Other where does the desire to kill stem from? Is it an unconscious motivation that comes from "knowing" the Other? Or is it a more of conscious motivation due to difference and fear of this difference?
similar to the notion of "Science" for Althusser, Butler seems to require an objective reality that one might be able to get closer and closer to. according to her, pictures can point to a reality that they cannot represent and as such they could be the basis for a better ethics, compassion, or empathy or something better....
hmm...
sure they point to some reality, as do all representations, the only reality there is: the subjective mediated cages of ourselves. all societies create their own consciousness, can this consciousness really be "shocked" out of itself?
hmm...
sure they point to some reality, as do all representations, the only reality there is: the subjective mediated cages of ourselves. all societies create their own consciousness, can this consciousness really be "shocked" out of itself?
The Image and the Viewer
Skimming over Butler again, something caught my eye with regards to images and how they play into a relationship between the subject and the viewer of the image. Butler mentions on page 143 the ability for the "paradigmatically human" (she uses the examples of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden) to reside outside of the frame and that the viewer is "unrepresented" and not captured by the image; interpellation comes into play again, and in a sense this interpellation is... indirect isn't quite the right word, but the viewer is made exactly into that: someone who looks on without being represented, as Butler puts it. Yet this unrepresented viewer holds the power to "capture and subdue, if not eviscerate, the image at hand."
So if the viewer (and by extension the media) has this power over an image and how it is interpreted, I was wondering if how that image is handled (captured, subdued, eviscerated) by a given viewer can change over time--and if the fact that the subject of the image exists "outside the frame" plays a role in any change. Would such an alteration be contingent upon that subject, or could change in how the image is digested occur without that factor (which would perhaps mean a change in the viewer instead)? As Butler mentioned, the pictures of children dying from napalm during the Vietnam War that shocked Americans and moved them outrage; the public reaction shifted with time, but that itself was the result of a subject's change.
So if the viewer (and by extension the media) has this power over an image and how it is interpreted, I was wondering if how that image is handled (captured, subdued, eviscerated) by a given viewer can change over time--and if the fact that the subject of the image exists "outside the frame" plays a role in any change. Would such an alteration be contingent upon that subject, or could change in how the image is digested occur without that factor (which would perhaps mean a change in the viewer instead)? As Butler mentioned, the pictures of children dying from napalm during the Vietnam War that shocked Americans and moved them outrage; the public reaction shifted with time, but that itself was the result of a subject's change.
“Orientalism”/”Negritude”
Despite the use of different strategies (partially derived from different legacies of thought, apparently), it seems that there is a (structural) parallelism between the modes in which both “Orientalism” and “Negritude” come into “being”: in/through discourse. The similarity of the mechanism(s) is striking.
Given the (I’d call it) “performative” dimension of discourse (discourse produces “truth”), isn’t there a danger in outlining / throwing into discourse the (potentially “true”) mechanism of the coming into “being” of “Orientalism” and “Negritude”? Isn’t there the danger that this throwing into discourse (through theorizing) might actually have a conservative effect?
The Ethical and the Linguistic
“That situation is one in which we are addressed, in which the other directs language towards us.” (Butler, 139)
As the ethical arises – in Levinas’s model (undertaken by Butler, as well) – as a function of the (linguistic) situation (“language arrives at an address we do not will” – Butler, 139; we cannot control the flow and directionality of the language we temporarily appropriate), apparently independently of the content of what is being said – which I see as being a function of the speaker (the human being), Levinasian ethics appears to me to paradoxically bracket the self in order to capture the mechanism of the “purely” ethical (indebted as it appears to be in structuralism, though transcending it). For, “to be addressed is to be, from the start, deprived of will” (Butler, 139).
The ethical gesture is a negative one, I would suggest: an act of censorship. Levinas’ is a negative ethics.
In light of : A different light
In Sensibility and the Face, Levinas operates an incredibly fascinating mutation within the binary light-obscurity (ultimately reducible to the binary presence-absence): obscurity as presence filling the space and emptied by the light – “The light makes the thing appear by driving out the shadows: it empties space. It makes space arise specifically as void.” (Levinas ,189) (contrast with Plotin, for example: obscurity is nothing but the absence of light). This shift entails – in my view – a reconfiguration of presence as potentiality of the absence – presence in a new light (or a new concept of presence?), corresponding perhaps – again, in my view – to a new ideology of liveness emerging/dominating on the contemporary stage.
The Impossibility of the Same
Even though I find Levinas philosophy qua ethics superb, I believe that it is “idealistic” (in the “common”/everyday use of the word; for Levinas, “idealism is refused” – 216) in that it grows (beautifully) out of the assumption that the Same is actuality. I would argue, however, that, as there can be no identity without difference (as Butler also notes), there can neither be the Same. The self as the other is the actuality (thus existence is performance) that – it seems – neither Levinas nor Butler takes into account.
“Speech proceeds from absolute difference.” (Levinas, 194)
“The formal structure of language thereby announces the ethical inviolability of the Other and, without any odor of the "numinous", his "holiness”. (Levinas, 195)
Is language the “cause”/source/origin/condition of/for the absolute in-acccessibility of the other?
Despite the use of different strategies (partially derived from different legacies of thought, apparently), it seems that there is a (structural) parallelism between the modes in which both “Orientalism” and “Negritude” come into “being”: in/through discourse. The similarity of the mechanism(s) is striking.
Given the (I’d call it) “performative” dimension of discourse (discourse produces “truth”), isn’t there a danger in outlining / throwing into discourse the (potentially “true”) mechanism of the coming into “being” of “Orientalism” and “Negritude”? Isn’t there the danger that this throwing into discourse (through theorizing) might actually have a conservative effect?
The Ethical and the Linguistic
“That situation is one in which we are addressed, in which the other directs language towards us.” (Butler, 139)
As the ethical arises – in Levinas’s model (undertaken by Butler, as well) – as a function of the (linguistic) situation (“language arrives at an address we do not will” – Butler, 139; we cannot control the flow and directionality of the language we temporarily appropriate), apparently independently of the content of what is being said – which I see as being a function of the speaker (the human being), Levinasian ethics appears to me to paradoxically bracket the self in order to capture the mechanism of the “purely” ethical (indebted as it appears to be in structuralism, though transcending it). For, “to be addressed is to be, from the start, deprived of will” (Butler, 139).
The ethical gesture is a negative one, I would suggest: an act of censorship. Levinas’ is a negative ethics.
In light of : A different light
In Sensibility and the Face, Levinas operates an incredibly fascinating mutation within the binary light-obscurity (ultimately reducible to the binary presence-absence): obscurity as presence filling the space and emptied by the light – “The light makes the thing appear by driving out the shadows: it empties space. It makes space arise specifically as void.” (Levinas ,189) (contrast with Plotin, for example: obscurity is nothing but the absence of light). This shift entails – in my view – a reconfiguration of presence as potentiality of the absence – presence in a new light (or a new concept of presence?), corresponding perhaps – again, in my view – to a new ideology of liveness emerging/dominating on the contemporary stage.
The Impossibility of the Same
Even though I find Levinas philosophy qua ethics superb, I believe that it is “idealistic” (in the “common”/everyday use of the word; for Levinas, “idealism is refused” – 216) in that it grows (beautifully) out of the assumption that the Same is actuality. I would argue, however, that, as there can be no identity without difference (as Butler also notes), there can neither be the Same. The self as the other is the actuality (thus existence is performance) that – it seems – neither Levinas nor Butler takes into account.
“Speech proceeds from absolute difference.” (Levinas, 194)
“The formal structure of language thereby announces the ethical inviolability of the Other and, without any odor of the "numinous", his "holiness”. (Levinas, 195)
Is language the “cause”/source/origin/condition of/for the absolute in-acccessibility of the other?
Friday, April 3, 2009
Doane claims that for Marx value is based on a purely social social system of exchange. I am unclear why the word "social" is used. In order to put an exchange value on something, Marx believes one must see the commodity in relation to other commodities which consequentially transforms the commodity into the form of signification. The attribution of value to each and every commodity in relation to another, however, seems subjective, individualistic, and far from social. Is it social in the sense that relationships between objects are solely based on human labor to create these objects? Is it social in the sense that the reliance on signification over the commodity itself has become a popular mainstay in the general public? Marx has the idea that the process is based on social value, yet he goes on to claim that the result is a concealment of human contact. The relations between people abiding by the process therefore seem to be the antithesis of "social". Can the phenomenon of exchange value be called social when people become alienated from one another when following it?
Lecture on March 31
I would like to comment how Marxism seemed to be straightforward compared to other essays. At the first time when I was just reading the essay, it was very comprehensible, maybe implying that what Marx is proposing makes logical sense for me. I especially found his articulate definition of commodity at the beginning of his essay intriguing. As Emily notes in her blog, I found a strong connection between commodity and prostitution as a kind of social exchange.
Thursday, April 2, 2009
I found the Ideological State Apparatuses that Althusser notes to be very similar to the types of dominant discursive bodies that Foucault notes in History of Sexuality, Vol. 1. It was intriguing to read that they are described as working in similar ways, with reproduction of dominant discourses being sifted through them concerning ways to "act properly" in society; in this case how to act properly economically and sexuality, respectively.
The most interesting part of Two or Three Things I Know About Her for me was the role commodity played in the movie. This is mostly because it wasn't immediately apparent for me until Prof. Doane's lecture on Tuesday. The role of prostitution in the movie, and in any society, seems to me to be the ultimate form of commodity exchange. One can argue that in an environment of constant and fluid exchange, the only entity one truly and irrevocably possesses is one's own body. Prostitution is so extreme because it means giving that one thing up in exchange for goods of necessarily lesser value.
The context of prostitution in Godard's movie also played an important role in the sub-text of commodity exchange throughout. This prostitution was not occurring on the street, but in fact between men and married, suburban, middle-class women in organized brothels, emphasizing the fact that every part of a capitalist society is based on exchange, however extreme it may be.
There was a quote at one point in the movie, I don't remember it exactly but it was something about cities being forms existing in space. I was reminded of this quote during Godard's final shot of the products on the lawn: they were simply forms existing in space. I interpreted this to mean that cities are made up of nothing more than commodities themselves.
Bricolage puts in another appearance
"Ideology... is for Marx an imaginary assemblage (bricolage), a pure dream, empty and vain, constituted by the 'day's residues' from the only full and positive reality, that of the concrete history of concrete material individuals materially producing their existence." (Althusser, 160)
What does Althusser mean here? I find it odd that he (or maybe it's more accurate to say Marx) describes ideology as "empty and vain" while he simultaneously conflates it with a concept that, according to Derrida, ought to be in charge of language's construction.* Perhaps Althusser (again, is it more or less accurate to say Marx?) is referring to the fact that ideology is ahistorical, and bricolage itself is an originating force, and that they are both arbitrary in their own constructions. Yet it still strikes me as peculiar that he describes them as "empty" and "null," if only because that use of diction almost implies to me a lack of power, something which I don't think applies to ideology/bricolage at all. I don't think Althusser, by any stretch of the imagination, is saying that ideology lacks power, but I feel (and I admit, it's probably nothing more than a knee-jerk reaction on my part) as if his language unintentionally trivializes the two concepts.
(*Based on this, I think Ioana's question about ideology=the unconscious=language, at least on the grounds of their structure, is an astute observation, and I agree with her that it does appear to be the case.)
What does Althusser mean here? I find it odd that he (or maybe it's more accurate to say Marx) describes ideology as "empty and vain" while he simultaneously conflates it with a concept that, according to Derrida, ought to be in charge of language's construction.* Perhaps Althusser (again, is it more or less accurate to say Marx?) is referring to the fact that ideology is ahistorical, and bricolage itself is an originating force, and that they are both arbitrary in their own constructions. Yet it still strikes me as peculiar that he describes them as "empty" and "null," if only because that use of diction almost implies to me a lack of power, something which I don't think applies to ideology/bricolage at all. I don't think Althusser, by any stretch of the imagination, is saying that ideology lacks power, but I feel (and I admit, it's probably nothing more than a knee-jerk reaction on my part) as if his language unintentionally trivializes the two concepts.
(*Based on this, I think Ioana's question about ideology=the unconscious=language, at least on the grounds of their structure, is an astute observation, and I agree with her that it does appear to be the case.)
Marx and Althusser’s Ideologies
Observation:
Based on this week’s readings from Marx and Althusser (put in relation, of course, with previous readings for this class), I reached the conclusion that a shift/transfer to metaphysics in one form or another at a certain point in the arguments is necessary for the consistency and satisfactory operation of the (arguably “cultural”) theories put forth (by the thinkers under scrutiny).
Interrogations:
In continuation to my observation above – serving as an introduction to my response, I will structure my post as a series of interrogations:
1) Does Marx’s project consist in the recuperation of the centrality and uniqueness of the use-value within a necessarily modified society (and a transformed infrastructure, perhaps)? What is at stake in the denunciation of the naturalization of the process of exchange?
2) The reference to “the magic of money” as well as the inversion in causal relation that Marx posits in the conclusion of his chapter on “Commodities” in The Capital is particularly intriguing, in my view: “What appears to happen is not that a particular commodity becomes money because all the other commodities express their values in it, but, on the contrary, that all other commodities universally express their values in a particular commodity because it is money.” (Marx, 187).
On account of this, money is – to use Althusser’s formulation – “always already”, just like Althusser’s ideology and condition of subject(ivity), or like Foucault’s “p(/P)ower”. Even though an avowedly social construct in Marx’s theory of the commodities, money becomes, I would argue, a metaphysical concept that holds the argument together. It is at this point (in his account of money), I believe, that Marx makes the – unacknowledged – move to metaphysics in this chapter (just as Althusser makes the move to metaphysics when he claims that “individuals are always-already subjects” – 176, that the existence of ideology precedes all existence).
3) It strikes me that both Marx and Althusser – in contrast to structuralist and poststructuralist thinkers – appear to leave the concept of reality intact (though hardly ever accessible). This assumption gets complicated, however, (at least in Althusser), when he (Althusser) asserts “the effective presence of a new reality: ideology” (133). If ideology becomes “reality”/ “obviousness” – and is experienced as such – then what is the point in denouncing it as a fake/fraud? However fascinating I find Althusser’s argument to be (just like Spinoza’s about human freedom – which I believe Althusser’s theory is a version of and about which I asked myself the same question), I cannot help asking what is the point in the denunciation of ideology as a sort of fake. At the point of conversion in “obviousness”, ideology becomes ontology, in my view.
4) For Freud, the unconscious is endowed with a structure; for Lacan, the unconscious is structured like a language. For Althusser, ideology is “exactly like the unconscious” (Althusser, 161) in that it is “eternal”. Does this mean that ideology is structured as a language? (it appears to me that it does).
5) Prof. Doane referred in her lecture to Althusser’s strategy of introducing the discursive realm of “s(/S)cience” in opposition to ideology as a means of giving consistency to his theory about Ideology and the State. If Althusser’s theory is supposed to belong to science, is this also true of Marx’s philosophy that Althusser re-reads or does (“vulgar”) Marxism – in the final analysis – belong to Ideology?
Moreover, Althusser puts forth a new theory of t(/T)heory, on account of which he calls for the “supersession” of the descriptive theory of the State that Marxism proposes (138). To what extent is this “supersession” also a suppression (of Marxism to make room for the Althusserian theory)?
Based on this week’s readings from Marx and Althusser (put in relation, of course, with previous readings for this class), I reached the conclusion that a shift/transfer to metaphysics in one form or another at a certain point in the arguments is necessary for the consistency and satisfactory operation of the (arguably “cultural”) theories put forth (by the thinkers under scrutiny).
Interrogations:
In continuation to my observation above – serving as an introduction to my response, I will structure my post as a series of interrogations:
1) Does Marx’s project consist in the recuperation of the centrality and uniqueness of the use-value within a necessarily modified society (and a transformed infrastructure, perhaps)? What is at stake in the denunciation of the naturalization of the process of exchange?
2) The reference to “the magic of money” as well as the inversion in causal relation that Marx posits in the conclusion of his chapter on “Commodities” in The Capital is particularly intriguing, in my view: “What appears to happen is not that a particular commodity becomes money because all the other commodities express their values in it, but, on the contrary, that all other commodities universally express their values in a particular commodity because it is money.” (Marx, 187).
On account of this, money is – to use Althusser’s formulation – “always already”, just like Althusser’s ideology and condition of subject(ivity), or like Foucault’s “p(/P)ower”. Even though an avowedly social construct in Marx’s theory of the commodities, money becomes, I would argue, a metaphysical concept that holds the argument together. It is at this point (in his account of money), I believe, that Marx makes the – unacknowledged – move to metaphysics in this chapter (just as Althusser makes the move to metaphysics when he claims that “individuals are always-already subjects” – 176, that the existence of ideology precedes all existence).
3) It strikes me that both Marx and Althusser – in contrast to structuralist and poststructuralist thinkers – appear to leave the concept of reality intact (though hardly ever accessible). This assumption gets complicated, however, (at least in Althusser), when he (Althusser) asserts “the effective presence of a new reality: ideology” (133). If ideology becomes “reality”/ “obviousness” – and is experienced as such – then what is the point in denouncing it as a fake/fraud? However fascinating I find Althusser’s argument to be (just like Spinoza’s about human freedom – which I believe Althusser’s theory is a version of and about which I asked myself the same question), I cannot help asking what is the point in the denunciation of ideology as a sort of fake. At the point of conversion in “obviousness”, ideology becomes ontology, in my view.
4) For Freud, the unconscious is endowed with a structure; for Lacan, the unconscious is structured like a language. For Althusser, ideology is “exactly like the unconscious” (Althusser, 161) in that it is “eternal”. Does this mean that ideology is structured as a language? (it appears to me that it does).
5) Prof. Doane referred in her lecture to Althusser’s strategy of introducing the discursive realm of “s(/S)cience” in opposition to ideology as a means of giving consistency to his theory about Ideology and the State. If Althusser’s theory is supposed to belong to science, is this also true of Marx’s philosophy that Althusser re-reads or does (“vulgar”) Marxism – in the final analysis – belong to Ideology?
Moreover, Althusser puts forth a new theory of t(/T)heory, on account of which he calls for the “supersession” of the descriptive theory of the State that Marxism proposes (138). To what extent is this “supersession” also a suppression (of Marxism to make room for the Althusserian theory)?
p.178:
"...we should note that all this 'procedure' to set up Christian religious subjects is dominated by a strange phenomenon: the fact that there can only be such a multitude of possible religious subjects on the absolute condition that there is a Unique, Absolute, Other Subject, i.e. God."
In this passage, Althusser is discussing the methodology by which the Christian religious ideology takes hold on its subjects. When I first read this, I didn't quite understand why he felt it necessary to include this notion in his classification. He goes on to describe a "conversation" between God and Moses, in which God states "I am that I am."
This notion of a direct interpellation to Moses by God seems, in a way, contradictorily assigned. If the subject recognizes, as Moses does, that he is a subject of and for "the Subject", then the notion of ideology beyond the conscious mind is greatly diminished. It appears that the unconscious ideology, at least in the Christian religious context, becomes more of a conscious "mission" with established goals, created and maintained by the Subject. Althusser argues that each subject "can contemplate its own image (present and future)" (p.180), yet to what level is the ideology responsible for this notion of interdependence? If the ideology is dependent on this Other Subject, who has absolute authority, then how could this same ideology produce subjects with autonomy? If the ideology is in fact instilled in the subjects in this manner of brute recognition, then how could one call it an ideology instead of simply a "world-view"?
"...we should note that all this 'procedure' to set up Christian religious subjects is dominated by a strange phenomenon: the fact that there can only be such a multitude of possible religious subjects on the absolute condition that there is a Unique, Absolute, Other Subject, i.e. God."
In this passage, Althusser is discussing the methodology by which the Christian religious ideology takes hold on its subjects. When I first read this, I didn't quite understand why he felt it necessary to include this notion in his classification. He goes on to describe a "conversation" between God and Moses, in which God states "I am that I am."
This notion of a direct interpellation to Moses by God seems, in a way, contradictorily assigned. If the subject recognizes, as Moses does, that he is a subject of and for "the Subject", then the notion of ideology beyond the conscious mind is greatly diminished. It appears that the unconscious ideology, at least in the Christian religious context, becomes more of a conscious "mission" with established goals, created and maintained by the Subject. Althusser argues that each subject "can contemplate its own image (present and future)" (p.180), yet to what level is the ideology responsible for this notion of interdependence? If the ideology is dependent on this Other Subject, who has absolute authority, then how could this same ideology produce subjects with autonomy? If the ideology is in fact instilled in the subjects in this manner of brute recognition, then how could one call it an ideology instead of simply a "world-view"?
Thursday, March 19, 2009
Everything/Nothing
“Thus, what they desire is precisely nothing, and at the same time everything. (…) Their desire is often interpreted, and feared, as a sort of insatiable hunger, a voracity that will swallow you whole.” (29)
Interestingly, in Irigaray woman (the feminine) is not denied either pleasure (on the contrary, "she" is, in a certain sense, almost polymorphously perverse - "woman has sex organs more or less everywhere" - 28, much like the child in the early stages of development of his/her sexuality in Freud's account ) or desire (this is in contrast to the position of other scholars - such as Mary Ann Doane, for example, for whom the woman only has "the desire to desire", precisely because she is denied any autonomous representation). In fact, it appears to me that desire (and pleasure) is the principle around which Irigaray’s entire discourse is organized. The problem with “the feminine” therefore becomes (for Irigaray) that, in a phallocentric society, the woman does no longer have an autonomous desire (“she will not say what she herself wants; moreover, she does not know, or no longer knows, what she wants.” - 25).
Even though I find Irigaray’s discourse fascinating and the strategic essentialism and mimicry (mimetisme) she employs, useful strategies, I believe that the organization of the discourse around the principle of desire is a weak point in her undertaking. “An Ethics of Sexual Difference” appears to be necessarily a sort of hedonistic ethics – in which attaining the greatest quantity of the greatest autonomous desire seems to be the highest goal and the defining characteristic of “a good life”.
Although I am aware (yet, not certain) that the desire principle is intimately intertwined with the psycho-analytic discourse in general, I would suggest that its replacement with another “goal” would be a possible solution for the problem of “the feminine” and its “lacks”.
Similarly, I realize (though, again, I am not certain) that the inscription of Irigaray’s discourse within the framework of psycho-analysis might require this move, but I am, nevertheless, intrigued by the fact that acceptance/refusal (resistance) is not a functioning binary in Irigaray. The woman never says “NO”: she never resists the representation that is being imposed upon her (although “she resists all definition” - 26). Nor does she play it! On the one hand, because of the postulated plurality of the sexuality (doubtful though it is, either as a fact of nature, or of culture) – because “woman is always touching herself”, she is necessarily continuously subversive (she does not respect the “taboo against touching of a highly obsessive civilization” - 27). On the other hand, the woman is necessarily continuously mysterious (28). These two aspects represent potential positions /sources of power, I would claim. The problem (and cause of the perpetual feminine subjection) is perhaps that the woman always plays the victim instead of playing the difference.
Notes
In her account, Irigaray does not attribute “the” (definite article) to “woman” (perhaps in order to suggest that the feminine has no determination). I believe this to be a reinforcement of a/the “phallocentric order”. For this reason – as you might have already noticed – I am using “the woman” in my post.
For me, strategic essentialism and mimicry (mimetisme) are instances of playing the difference.
I believe that the question "Does this critique of Freud go so far as to challenge psychoanalytic theory and practice?" posed to Irigaray in "The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine" interview (72) justly (though implicitly) points to the necessity of re-considering the fundamental tenets of psychoanalysis (as a theoretical body). It appears to me that - without this necessary reassessment - programmatically working in the domain of psychoanalysis involves the acceptance of several inevitable foundational principles that prevent the development of diverse directions of thought and eventually lead to circular arguments.
Question Marks
Why is/should “the alternative between a defensive virginity, fiercely turned in upon itself, and a body open to penetration” (24) (be) “impossible” ?
Why does Riddles of the Sphinx (which I found aesthetically fascinating) propose the necessity of giving up the Mother-position? In my view, this is a most unreasonable move and an instance of NOT-playing the difference that might result in the enforcement of feminine subjection. (Matriarchy, I would argue, was grounded precisely in the acknowledgment of the privileged role of woman as child-bearer)
Interestingly, in Irigaray woman (the feminine) is not denied either pleasure (on the contrary, "she" is, in a certain sense, almost polymorphously perverse - "woman has sex organs more or less everywhere" - 28, much like the child in the early stages of development of his/her sexuality in Freud's account ) or desire (this is in contrast to the position of other scholars - such as Mary Ann Doane, for example, for whom the woman only has "the desire to desire", precisely because she is denied any autonomous representation). In fact, it appears to me that desire (and pleasure) is the principle around which Irigaray’s entire discourse is organized. The problem with “the feminine” therefore becomes (for Irigaray) that, in a phallocentric society, the woman does no longer have an autonomous desire (“she will not say what she herself wants; moreover, she does not know, or no longer knows, what she wants.” - 25).
Even though I find Irigaray’s discourse fascinating and the strategic essentialism and mimicry (mimetisme) she employs, useful strategies, I believe that the organization of the discourse around the principle of desire is a weak point in her undertaking. “An Ethics of Sexual Difference” appears to be necessarily a sort of hedonistic ethics – in which attaining the greatest quantity of the greatest autonomous desire seems to be the highest goal and the defining characteristic of “a good life”.
Although I am aware (yet, not certain) that the desire principle is intimately intertwined with the psycho-analytic discourse in general, I would suggest that its replacement with another “goal” would be a possible solution for the problem of “the feminine” and its “lacks”.
Similarly, I realize (though, again, I am not certain) that the inscription of Irigaray’s discourse within the framework of psycho-analysis might require this move, but I am, nevertheless, intrigued by the fact that acceptance/refusal (resistance) is not a functioning binary in Irigaray. The woman never says “NO”: she never resists the representation that is being imposed upon her (although “she resists all definition” - 26). Nor does she play it! On the one hand, because of the postulated plurality of the sexuality (doubtful though it is, either as a fact of nature, or of culture) – because “woman is always touching herself”, she is necessarily continuously subversive (she does not respect the “taboo against touching of a highly obsessive civilization” - 27). On the other hand, the woman is necessarily continuously mysterious (28). These two aspects represent potential positions /sources of power, I would claim. The problem (and cause of the perpetual feminine subjection) is perhaps that the woman always plays the victim instead of playing the difference.
Notes
In her account, Irigaray does not attribute “the” (definite article) to “woman” (perhaps in order to suggest that the feminine has no determination). I believe this to be a reinforcement of a/the “phallocentric order”. For this reason – as you might have already noticed – I am using “the woman” in my post.
For me, strategic essentialism and mimicry (mimetisme) are instances of playing the difference.
I believe that the question "Does this critique of Freud go so far as to challenge psychoanalytic theory and practice?" posed to Irigaray in "The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine" interview (72) justly (though implicitly) points to the necessity of re-considering the fundamental tenets of psychoanalysis (as a theoretical body). It appears to me that - without this necessary reassessment - programmatically working in the domain of psychoanalysis involves the acceptance of several inevitable foundational principles that prevent the development of diverse directions of thought and eventually lead to circular arguments.
Question Marks
Why is/should “the alternative between a defensive virginity, fiercely turned in upon itself, and a body open to penetration” (24) (be) “impossible” ?
Why does Riddles of the Sphinx (which I found aesthetically fascinating) propose the necessity of giving up the Mother-position? In my view, this is a most unreasonable move and an instance of NOT-playing the difference that might result in the enforcement of feminine subjection. (Matriarchy, I would argue, was grounded precisely in the acknowledgment of the privileged role of woman as child-bearer)
This Sex Which Is Not One
To be honest, when first encountering this essay, I was highly puzzled as it is true that my own notion of sexuality or feminism has been vague and I did not hold any clear understanding of it. As Emily points out, when Irigaray asserts that men needs instruments including "his hands, women's body, and language..." (24). And afterward, the author explains how a woman is able to touch herself without an instrument unlike men. However, what had me extremly intrigued comes from the relationship between the two opposite sex. As Irigaray claims that female "sexuality has always been conceptualized on the basis of masculine parameters", is it that men serves as an agent to give rise to women's sexuality? Or, while woman's body serves as men's instrument, can men be woman's mediator in finding and realizing her sexuality?
Kristeva mentions on pages 14-15 of her essay two "methods" that allow women to gain power; the first involves women gaining power within a society and assimilating to that power structure, and the second seems more related to women creating a parallel countersociety where feminism has the potential to become inverted and sexist itself. When women assimilate to a system's power structure and essentially become part of the patriarchy, it seems to me a sign that they cannot escape the system because of how ingrained those patriarchal views are within it. In the second example, where women form their own counterpower, can they be said to have escaped the system? I'm personally inclined to say no, as she then goes on to say that "the very logic of counterpower and of countersociety necessarily generates, by its very structure, its essence as a simulacrum of the combated society or of power." [16] So if neither can be entirely divorced from a patriarchal society, what does that say about the nature of the system--does it support the belief that it springs fully formed at once, and its origin is impossible to trace? What does this mean for Freud, Lacan, and Irigaray? How does this idea (if accurate, but perhaps it isn't) mesh with their theories?
I find Irigary's use of the parenthetical their, in the last sentence of This Sex Which is Not One, very confusing and somewhat hypocritical. As a modifier of place it must connote a hierarchy and as such it seems to defeat the purpose of the whole essay. Is that a conscious addition as part of the inevitable that she alludes to, or is it a factor of her own place in the phallocratism?
"In order to touch himself, man needs an instrument: his hand, a woman's body, language..."
(Irigaray, 24)
This sentence in This Sex Which Is Not One seemed odd when i first read it. Even now, I can't quite figure out what Irigaray meant when she wrote this; how does a man 'touch himself' with language? The immediate association I made was to Saussure's conception of language as a system. Through this analysis, Irigaray is almost comparing a woman's body and a system. This made me wonder: can a body in fact be called a system? Or, can sexuality be called a system?
Coming from a Gender & Sexuality Studies background, I found the film for this week, The Riddle of the Sphinx, to be extremely intriguing. I found it to be a great critique of patriarchy and demonstrates the "othering" of women. The scene taking place in the kitchen, where the female protagonist, who you only view from the midsection is making food is especially great in my opinion. The voice over of the repetition of tasks brought the old axiom "A women's work is never done" to my mind as we see this woman preparing a meal, cleaning the dishes, taking care of her child, all while her husbands leans against the counter eating the crusts from the piece of bread that the protagonist has prepared. Another interesting thought that could be extrapolated from this scene is since we do not see the faces of the adults it is almost like we are viewing this scene from the perspective of a child, thus seeing how the dominant discourse of "proper" gender roles can be reproduced through unintentional teaching.
The film brought up some greats points regarding feminitiy and feminism, such as the one shown above, but also others like the woman's "double duty" (being able to work outside the home but still being expected to do every household task as well) and the male gaze in cinema (the acrobatic scene, while kinda trippy simply portrays a women doing acrobatic/vaguely sexual acts alone on the screen). While at first I thought the film was too farfetched for me, in hindsight I see the relevant points it was attempting to bring up.
The film brought up some greats points regarding feminitiy and feminism, such as the one shown above, but also others like the woman's "double duty" (being able to work outside the home but still being expected to do every household task as well) and the male gaze in cinema (the acrobatic scene, while kinda trippy simply portrays a women doing acrobatic/vaguely sexual acts alone on the screen). While at first I thought the film was too farfetched for me, in hindsight I see the relevant points it was attempting to bring up.
Friday, March 13, 2009
In response to Emily’s thoughts, I think someone who has knowledge of the Freudian interpretation of dreams, when lucid dreaming, would try to control the manifest content of the dream in such a way as to escape the normal psychoanalytic analysis of dreams. The conscious would direct the person to switch the contents so that the usual analysis would not point to the actual anxiety-causing factor in the unconscious. The person would be aware of the effects of displacement, condensation, etc., and realizing how the manifest content would refer to the latent, would direct the content to be something else. The shifts and switches a lucid dreamer makes, however, probably also stem from what is going on in the unconscious, only adding another layer of repressed thoughts to analyzed. Knowing that the subject was lucid dreaming, Freud would probably analyze the dream deeper, ultimately leading to the true latent content. In Freudian analysis of dreams, I don’t think one would ever be able to escape being analyzed in these terms.
I am also interested in Caitlin's question of where a metaphor appears initially. As stated in class, however, under Freud, anything can function as a metaphor as it has more to do with substitution. If this were the case, the notion of a relationship between two objects would not be important until after the fact. At the same time, does a substitution occur at complete random and, if not, is there a connection (reminiscent of a relationship) made unconsciously? It seems that for Lacan, the relationship is primary and only through the relationship can a significance between two objects arise and determine language.
Do Freud and Lacan's theories oppose each other? It would seem that they do but no such opposition was mentioned in class. I suppose for Freud the physical precedes the psychological and for Lacan the psychological precedes the physical and, in making the relationship between the two theories of Freud and Lacan, readers must be wary which model they use.
Do Freud and Lacan's theories oppose each other? It would seem that they do but no such opposition was mentioned in class. I suppose for Freud the physical precedes the psychological and for Lacan the psychological precedes the physical and, in making the relationship between the two theories of Freud and Lacan, readers must be wary which model they use.
Thursday, March 12, 2009
Answering Questions
Let me give my opinion on some of the people's response or attempt to come up with an answer to the questions proposed.
Firstly, I absolutely agree to Ryan's commentary raised from his deep impression about Lacan's Mirror Stage. I also found this explanation very helpful and illustrative that I better understood. However, Ryan seemed to question about the role of the third person and the necessity of the person being a mother as it was specifically provided as mother in Lacan's essay. In my point of view, first of all, I do not believe that it does not matter whoever is working as an agent to make a baby aware of his/her subjectivity. The point from this analysis is that baby is not able to acknowledge the image as his or her own image reflected. That being said, it is important that there is someone like a mother figure to help the little baby out.
Secondly, I do not think that I can "answer" the question, but would like to give my personal response to the questions raised by Ioana: Are human beings necessarily assigned the positions of “subject”, “ego”, “other” (of Lacan’s “quadrature of the ego’s verifications”, 4), or could “things” also be an option? (the position of “things” is arguably assigned to women in classic Hollywood films, for example, I would suggest). I believe that the first question itself is not valid. Human beings are not assigned the positions of subject. However, they create subjectivity, ego, etc; thus, not passively. Human beings would assign concept of subject and ego from their presence, while actively developing their ego. Talking about the second part, I would like to say "things" could be an option. Especially when you are talking of a person who is not present at the instance of discourse, it is more prevalent.
Firstly, I absolutely agree to Ryan's commentary raised from his deep impression about Lacan's Mirror Stage. I also found this explanation very helpful and illustrative that I better understood. However, Ryan seemed to question about the role of the third person and the necessity of the person being a mother as it was specifically provided as mother in Lacan's essay. In my point of view, first of all, I do not believe that it does not matter whoever is working as an agent to make a baby aware of his/her subjectivity. The point from this analysis is that baby is not able to acknowledge the image as his or her own image reflected. That being said, it is important that there is someone like a mother figure to help the little baby out.
Secondly, I do not think that I can "answer" the question, but would like to give my personal response to the questions raised by Ioana: Are human beings necessarily assigned the positions of “subject”, “ego”, “other” (of Lacan’s “quadrature of the ego’s verifications”, 4), or could “things” also be an option? (the position of “things” is arguably assigned to women in classic Hollywood films, for example, I would suggest). I believe that the first question itself is not valid. Human beings are not assigned the positions of subject. However, they create subjectivity, ego, etc; thus, not passively. Human beings would assign concept of subject and ego from their presence, while actively developing their ego. Talking about the second part, I would like to say "things" could be an option. Especially when you are talking of a person who is not present at the instance of discourse, it is more prevalent.
My question has to deal with Lacan's mirror stage concept and something that Professor Doane brought up in lecture on Tuesday. As the child looks at its image in the mirror, it cannot distinguish that this reflection is actually an image of itself. It takes the mother confirming that this image is in fact the child to create this sense of subjectivity. However, this does not fit in the mold of every family, so to speak, as there is not always a mother present in any given family structure to confirm things to the child. Is the mother a necessity in Lacan's argument? Or could any parental type figure do the same confirming action that the "mother" does?
Something that struck me as particularly interesting from lecture today was when Prof. Doane talked about how a dream is only available to the analyst through the patient's recounting of the dream; the words chosen to describe the dream are of the utmost importance. This got me thinking about lucid dreaming: when one records or recounts dreams regularly, it becomes easier and easier to control one's own actions in, and outcomes of dreams. How would a lucid dream be able to be psycho-analyzed? When one is having a lucid dream, are one's own choices determined by the conscious or the unconscious? Furthermore, would Freud even think that lucid dreaming is a real phenomenon?
On Lacan in a “new” style
I – tempted, intrigued, and inspired as I was by Lacan to find new styles of writing that challenge the conventional ones – will post a rather un-systematic response to this week’s readings:
1 – When reading the following passage from Lacan (“it is the whole structure of language that psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious”, 139), I had the following “in-sight”: one of the implications of the assertion that the unconscious is structured as a language is that the unconscious – instead of being an “unruly” amalgam of most diverse elements, as I had previously conceived of it, possibly due to the randomness, unpredictability, and fragmentation of its manifestations into the conscious – has a structure, which implies that it is strictly ordered, which implies that there are a set of in-variable principles that govern it (the unconscious). Moreover, the notion of “structure” suggests to me a unity, a whole, which makes me re-consider my understanding of the idea of the split subject that Lacan proposes.
2 – Does Lacan’s theory presuppose a kind of determinism?
The formulation that “language, with its structure, exists prior to each subject’s entry into language” (139) suggests, in my view, that it does.
3 – In the lecture on Thursday, Prof. Doane called attention to the following passage from The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious: “The point is not to know whether I speak of myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather to know whether, when I speak of myself, I am the same as the self of whom I speak.” (156)
Aware though I am that this might be a stretch, I will propose the following reading of Lacan’s assertion: the speaking by/of the being induces the variability (/instability) of being. Simpl(isticall)y put, perhaps the subject is changed with every single utterance that the subject itself (what irony!) makes. The subject acts through language onto itself. The subject that speaks induces its own inconstancy and division.
4 – Another “in-sight”: The “I” is necessarily constituted as Other from the very “beginning” – Lacan’s account of the Mirror Stage suggests.
(Socrates’ fundamental imperative for a good life – “Know thyself” – is rendered irrelevant by Lacan’s proposition)
5 – The illustration that Lacan proposes in the place of that of Saussure (on page 143 of The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious) is intellectually appealing, but not a working formula: it completely disregards the fact that there is another case – the norm – in which Suassure’s model would be perfectly workable (gentlemen – corresponding image of the male body; ladies – corresponding image of the female body). It is worth mentioning in this respect that, in the example Lacan offers, the “gentlemen” and “ladies” are usually accompanied by representations of the male and the female’s bodies (stuck on the doors), respectively. Thus, the illustration that Lacan proposes is a “parasite” one, the exception.
6 – Lacan’s theory offers the perfect justification for the necessity of theatre/ performance. It is no surprise that his propositions have been undertaken in the discourse of Performance Studies.
7 – Are human beings necessarily assigned the positions of “subject”, “ego”, “other” (of Lacan’s “quadrature of the ego’s verifications”, 4), or could “things” also be an option? (the position of “things” is arguably assigned to women in classic Hollywood films, for example, I would suggest)
To be continued ….
I – tempted, intrigued, and inspired as I was by Lacan to find new styles of writing that challenge the conventional ones – will post a rather un-systematic response to this week’s readings:
1 – When reading the following passage from Lacan (“it is the whole structure of language that psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious”, 139), I had the following “in-sight”: one of the implications of the assertion that the unconscious is structured as a language is that the unconscious – instead of being an “unruly” amalgam of most diverse elements, as I had previously conceived of it, possibly due to the randomness, unpredictability, and fragmentation of its manifestations into the conscious – has a structure, which implies that it is strictly ordered, which implies that there are a set of in-variable principles that govern it (the unconscious). Moreover, the notion of “structure” suggests to me a unity, a whole, which makes me re-consider my understanding of the idea of the split subject that Lacan proposes.
2 – Does Lacan’s theory presuppose a kind of determinism?
The formulation that “language, with its structure, exists prior to each subject’s entry into language” (139) suggests, in my view, that it does.
3 – In the lecture on Thursday, Prof. Doane called attention to the following passage from The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious: “The point is not to know whether I speak of myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather to know whether, when I speak of myself, I am the same as the self of whom I speak.” (156)
Aware though I am that this might be a stretch, I will propose the following reading of Lacan’s assertion: the speaking by/of the being induces the variability (/instability) of being. Simpl(isticall)y put, perhaps the subject is changed with every single utterance that the subject itself (what irony!) makes. The subject acts through language onto itself. The subject that speaks induces its own inconstancy and division.
4 – Another “in-sight”: The “I” is necessarily constituted as Other from the very “beginning” – Lacan’s account of the Mirror Stage suggests.
(Socrates’ fundamental imperative for a good life – “Know thyself” – is rendered irrelevant by Lacan’s proposition)
5 – The illustration that Lacan proposes in the place of that of Saussure (on page 143 of The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious) is intellectually appealing, but not a working formula: it completely disregards the fact that there is another case – the norm – in which Suassure’s model would be perfectly workable (gentlemen – corresponding image of the male body; ladies – corresponding image of the female body). It is worth mentioning in this respect that, in the example Lacan offers, the “gentlemen” and “ladies” are usually accompanied by representations of the male and the female’s bodies (stuck on the doors), respectively. Thus, the illustration that Lacan proposes is a “parasite” one, the exception.
6 – Lacan’s theory offers the perfect justification for the necessity of theatre/ performance. It is no surprise that his propositions have been undertaken in the discourse of Performance Studies.
7 – Are human beings necessarily assigned the positions of “subject”, “ego”, “other” (of Lacan’s “quadrature of the ego’s verifications”, 4), or could “things” also be an option? (the position of “things” is arguably assigned to women in classic Hollywood films, for example, I would suggest)
To be continued ….
Metaphor and Metonymy
I was wondering about something that was mentioned today during lecture. Lacan believed that a comparison of sorts had to be made first before something could take on the other object's meanings (the actress/star example Professor Doane used). If this is then the case, that the metaphor is formed and then takes on other meanings, how do we get the metaphor in the first place? What compels a person/speaker/writer to make such a connection in the first place if the meanings are not already related? Is the metaphor then completely arbitrary, and if so, how can it be?
(On a slightly unrelated note, I find it interesting that the word metonymy means literally "change of name." Since the signifier and the signified don't touch in a metonymy--which actually confused me at first, because I thought of the two as being rather reliant on each other--it is perhaps logical that the two concepts remain separated by that bar; the change of name, such as White House meaning President, seems to hint at no overlap, but maybe just a slippage. It refers back to the shifting desire, which can't be satisfied exactly because there is no overlap.)
(On a slightly unrelated note, I find it interesting that the word metonymy means literally "change of name." Since the signifier and the signified don't touch in a metonymy--which actually confused me at first, because I thought of the two as being rather reliant on each other--it is perhaps logical that the two concepts remain separated by that bar; the change of name, such as White House meaning President, seems to hint at no overlap, but maybe just a slippage. It refers back to the shifting desire, which can't be satisfied exactly because there is no overlap.)
Friday, March 6, 2009
In lecture professor Doane mentioned that desire has no stable object, that there is always metonymic movement of displacement. This seems contradictory to me. Isn't the a basis of Freud's concept of sexuality that men always desire their mothers? From that enduring and most stable "fact" their whole lives are spent finding a replacement. So it is precisely because of the most stable object that the metonymic substitutions ensue.
Professor Doane said in class today that in Vertigo, the eye is an erotogenic zone. I understand how the eye plays a crucial role in the film; Scottie’s scopophilia, the audience’s voyeurism, Scottie’s vertigo (“dysfunction of eye in relation to space”) can all be traced back to a function of the eye. However, I don’t fully understand how that makes the eye an erotogenic zone when Sottie doesn’t necessarily feel sexual pleasure with the eyes. Also, when prof. Doane was explaining the oedipal complex, she mentioned that the fear of losing eyes is a form of castration anxiety? I am again unsure how the eyes relate to castration.
Thursday, March 5, 2009
Castration Anxiety
When reading about Castration Anxiety and its relationship or any kind of connection with Death, I became also interested and found them somewhat puzzling. I know that we are talking about a boy; however, I did not quite understand how a boy could undergo such traumatic experience that is possibly equal to death (?) when discovering a girl does not possesses a penis. As Audrey mentions in her blog, I am also wondering if one’s life is equivalent to “the object of the penis” since for Freud death is the highest form of castration.
However, I have to admit that (although I just asked the question) I do not think Freud literally means “castration” when comparing to Death. I believe he would have employed such word in order to metaphorically better bring meaning to the action of “taking something away from someone”.
However, I have to admit that (although I just asked the question) I do not think Freud literally means “castration” when comparing to Death. I believe he would have employed such word in order to metaphorically better bring meaning to the action of “taking something away from someone”.
Although not thoroughly discussed in class, Prof. Doane mentioned that death may be thought of as the highest form of castration anxiety. If such were the case, is Freud claiming that life is equivalent to the object of the penis and, if taken away (or castrated), is death to follow? Or is the looming fear of death cause for the boy to hold onto any symbol of life?
While death can be considered connected to the idea of castration anxiety, it can also be thought of as castration anxiety. The term "death" could have been used as another way of expressing the "trauma" the boy experiences when he discovers that women do not possess penises. However, where does this trauma stem from? Why does the boy have an inherent desire for the mother to have a penis?
I am unsure whether death precedes castration anxiety, follows it, or simply is it. Does the concept of death cause the boy to enter a state of castration anxiety, fearful of what could be taken away or does the traumatic moment act as a certain death of the child? Finally, is the trauma of castration anxiety equivalent to death subconsciously? I would like a definitive reason for such an anxiety as well as the concrete result in order to understand the implications of death in Freud's work.
While death can be considered connected to the idea of castration anxiety, it can also be thought of as castration anxiety. The term "death" could have been used as another way of expressing the "trauma" the boy experiences when he discovers that women do not possess penises. However, where does this trauma stem from? Why does the boy have an inherent desire for the mother to have a penis?
I am unsure whether death precedes castration anxiety, follows it, or simply is it. Does the concept of death cause the boy to enter a state of castration anxiety, fearful of what could be taken away or does the traumatic moment act as a certain death of the child? Finally, is the trauma of castration anxiety equivalent to death subconsciously? I would like a definitive reason for such an anxiety as well as the concrete result in order to understand the implications of death in Freud's work.
Both Levi-Strauss and Freud discuss the issue of incest in The Principles of Kinship and Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, respectively. I find the difference in each approach to the issue interesting: Levi-Strauss condemning incest purely because it is uneconomical, so to speak, and Freud claiming that incest is a purely natural instinct for a child (Oedipal Complex), and one which has profound effects on the child's development. However, this is not to say that Freud supports the act of incest, he simply supports the inevitabilty of a boy's subconscious desire for his mother. In short, I am intrigued by Levi-Strauss' treatment of incest in an economical light, and Freud's treatment of incest in a psychological light.
In the vein of mimesis I found the relationship of Scottie and Madeleine to be intriguing. Scottie starts to get obsessed with Madeleine who is in effect attempting to "mimic" Carlotta (in the form of hair style, the flowers, and the room). When Madeleine "dies" Scottie shifts his obsession onto Judy, who he crafts into a spitting image of Madeleine, having her "mimic" the way Madeleine dresses and acts. But when the viewer finds out that Judy was Madeleine all along, this image gets more complicated. Judy (who Scottie is making into a "copy" of Madeleine) has actually been "mimicking" the real Madeleine all along (up until her "death") and while mimicking Madeleine, Judy is also mimicking Carlotta as well. So by the end of the movie, Scottie falls in love with a copy of a copy of a copy (turning Judy into Madeleine who was Madeleine acting like Carlotta). This is all vaguely in line with the theory of performativity (very vaguely) but something that I noticed and found interesting.
Influence and Nostalgia
Similar to what Ioana touched on, I found Freud's distinction between the repressed and surmounted uncanny experiences interesting. Since he mentions how these experiences can harken back both to both personal complexes of infancy as well as primitive (so to speak) concepts, I wondered how that contributed to the idea that sexuality is predominantly a social construct. He says that the infantile and primitive aspects are connected, and perhaps overlap ("Uncanny" 157), but can they do this easily if they represent different forces on sexuality and the unconscious? Do they even work as different forces, though, or are they cut from the same cloth?
And on a different matter: if pleasure is a function of repetition, as Professor Doane mentioned, then does that agree with Levi-Strauss's idea that we have a desire for the nostalgia of a time when language had value? Would this imply that there is something inherently inferior about post-pubescent sexuality?
And on a different matter: if pleasure is a function of repetition, as Professor Doane mentioned, then does that agree with Levi-Strauss's idea that we have a desire for the nostalgia of a time when language had value? Would this imply that there is something inherently inferior about post-pubescent sexuality?
“Uncanny” Freud
1) I find the readings from Freud for this week to be particularly intriguing because of the two apparently contradictory moves that they seem to entail.
On the one hand – as Prof. Doane emphasized in the lectures – Freud moves from nature (essence) towards culture by proposing the model of the polymorphous child for whom all erotogenic zones are potential sources of satisfaction (Three Theories of Sexuality, 50). This model presupposes that sexual identity is not a given/ a fact of nature, but a construct – the result of struggles and cultural/social formations.
Freud’s discussion of castration anxiety and the Oedipal complex, on the other hand, appears to bring sexuality back in the realm of nature, grounding the necessity of a definitive state of inequality between men and women and of the inferiority of the latter. According to Freud, the woman is necessarily marked by lack/ castrated. Even though it appears to be intended to operate primarily at the level of the symbolic, this theory is constructed on a biological fact, supported with diverse “evidence” taken from “aesthetics” (The Uncanny, 122) and personal experience with neurotic patients, and formulated as a necessary and universal law of the Unconscious.
Thus, if the first of Freud’s moves provides fertile ground for feminism (as well as queer theory and other contemporary discourses, for that matter), the second one appears to enforce a patriarchal fixed state of affairs – given that the Oedipal complex and its implications are formulated as laws of the Unconscious – completely unacceptable for the feminists (which raises questions for me about the effectiveness of adopting the Freudian model in feminist attempts to annihilate patriarchy and its implications). Rather than merely describing the conditions of existence of a patriarchal society, Freud’s theory is enforcing/prescribing the patriarchal order while explaining it. The departure from nature was not completed.
2) What is the relation between the principle of “a repetition-compulsion” and mimesis (representation as mimesis)? Would the acceptance of “a repetition-compulsion” as a valid, necessary, and universal principle presuppose that theatre – the spectacle-machine based on repetition par excellence – is a mode of manifestation of the uncanny or an undoing of this category through the move to consciousness and to will/the voluntary?
3) Although I have doubts about the validity of Freud’s theory of sexuality, I find his theoretical approach fascinating as an epistemological undertaking. Freud indentifies “gaps in our knowledge” (Three Theories of Sexuality, 42) and proposes psycho-analysis as a method for knowledge production in order to “fill” these and create a coherent system for understanding. Presupposing a move into depth, beyond appearances, psycho-analysis as an epistemological method involves interpretation, intuition, and creativity, being superbly un-rigorous and, for this reason, a fascinating intellectual adventure for me.
On the one hand – as Prof. Doane emphasized in the lectures – Freud moves from nature (essence) towards culture by proposing the model of the polymorphous child for whom all erotogenic zones are potential sources of satisfaction (Three Theories of Sexuality, 50). This model presupposes that sexual identity is not a given/ a fact of nature, but a construct – the result of struggles and cultural/social formations.
Freud’s discussion of castration anxiety and the Oedipal complex, on the other hand, appears to bring sexuality back in the realm of nature, grounding the necessity of a definitive state of inequality between men and women and of the inferiority of the latter. According to Freud, the woman is necessarily marked by lack/ castrated. Even though it appears to be intended to operate primarily at the level of the symbolic, this theory is constructed on a biological fact, supported with diverse “evidence” taken from “aesthetics” (The Uncanny, 122) and personal experience with neurotic patients, and formulated as a necessary and universal law of the Unconscious.
Thus, if the first of Freud’s moves provides fertile ground for feminism (as well as queer theory and other contemporary discourses, for that matter), the second one appears to enforce a patriarchal fixed state of affairs – given that the Oedipal complex and its implications are formulated as laws of the Unconscious – completely unacceptable for the feminists (which raises questions for me about the effectiveness of adopting the Freudian model in feminist attempts to annihilate patriarchy and its implications). Rather than merely describing the conditions of existence of a patriarchal society, Freud’s theory is enforcing/prescribing the patriarchal order while explaining it. The departure from nature was not completed.
2) What is the relation between the principle of “a repetition-compulsion” and mimesis (representation as mimesis)? Would the acceptance of “a repetition-compulsion” as a valid, necessary, and universal principle presuppose that theatre – the spectacle-machine based on repetition par excellence – is a mode of manifestation of the uncanny or an undoing of this category through the move to consciousness and to will/the voluntary?
3) Although I have doubts about the validity of Freud’s theory of sexuality, I find his theoretical approach fascinating as an epistemological undertaking. Freud indentifies “gaps in our knowledge” (Three Theories of Sexuality, 42) and proposes psycho-analysis as a method for knowledge production in order to “fill” these and create a coherent system for understanding. Presupposing a move into depth, beyond appearances, psycho-analysis as an epistemological method involves interpretation, intuition, and creativity, being superbly un-rigorous and, for this reason, a fascinating intellectual adventure for me.
Friday, February 27, 2009
Intertectuality
Intertextuality seems to an interesting topic for me. When talking about text, I will be expanding it to the greater level which would include anything that has a meaning. Examining how I have treated text (or any other media), I found myself buying into this concept. As Barthes asserts, a particular text is not isolatable from the chain of texts that came before. In my point of view, the chain of texts existed before the current one take a vital part in bringing a specific and unique meaning to the present text. However, I do not think that this concept does not have to be limited to “chronology”. While chronological relations of texts can be described “vertical “, the relationship of a particular text with other texts present at the same time frame can be referred “horizontal”. In the horizontal relationship, one would have a meaning partly because its relationship (opposition, reaction, interaction…) with other existence around it. Writing his blog has evoked me a question: then would there be anything that can be read without any regard to other existence or have a meaning by itself? is it always that one is granted a specific meaning? Can't there be one that can give meaning to itself?
In response to Barthes
Barthes spends the majority of his essay about textuality highlighting the binary oppositions that differentiate work from text. While this is undoubtedly a valuable distinction to create, I feel that he does not address the issues of direct physicality involved with both work and text. In what ways does the boundary between work and text dissolve, and to what degree, and under which circumstances? There are multitudinous situational schemata that could be instantiated to produce an empirical rhetoric of textuality, which may be more personally involved than Barthes binary oppositions.
In Tuesday’s lecture, Professor Doane explained Derrida’s idea that proper nouns can never do what it purports to do. I thought this concept was very intriguing, yet difficult for me to fully grasp. There is a desire expressed in a proper name, according to the inherent meaning the name possesses. A proper name aims to classify an individual as a unique being, but put in a system of differences, it loses that uniqueness it first aimed to convey. Does this mean a proper name cannot fulfill its purpose because it can never fully define the individual, although its purpose is to classify and differentiate one individual from another. Am I getting this at all? I wish to further comprehend this idea on proper names.
Thursday, February 26, 2009
The new criticism paid attention to the way form shaped meaning yet I am unsure what "form" constitued. According to Prof. Doane, Barthes opposed the new criticism because of the fact that he believed there existed a difference between text and work. I assume then that the new criticism's idea of form=Barthes' idea of work. It would seem that with the presence of a tangible object, the new criticism believed an analysis would follow. On the other hand, Barthes disputed such a notion, believing that set objects have set, yet general and public definitions. Barthes therefore argued for the importance of the "text" as everything it encompassed had meaning up for readers' interpretations. If a text is not tangible, however, how does a reader access it? Through what sense does a reader understand such a text? And, if a text is always up for analysis, is any one text available to multiple readers?
In my philosophy class, we've been spending a lot of time talking about substace; specifically, Aristotle's conception of substance versus Hume's Bundle Theory. This came to my mind in today's lecture while Professor Doane talked about the semic code. She said that the semic code involves characterization: attaching attributes and qualities to characters, places, objects, etc. But the implication here is that a character in a text is not a person, it's simply a proper name with associated qualities and properties. This represents the crux of the debate over the existence of substance. For Hume, every person, every object, every being is basically just a character when considered through the semic code. His Bundle Theory states that substance does not exist; that everything is an amalgamation of individual properties, which do not inhere in anything at all. However, Aristotle's opinion opposes Hume's: he believes that there is in fact something for each individual property to inhere in, and that beings and objects are more than just the sum of their parts; they have an intangible nature, or, substance. This leads me to realize that real people, physical objects, and living beings are all substantial, or representative of Aristotle's views, while characters represented in a text, or even in film, are all examples of Hume's Bundle Theory.
Starring a text: a few questions
I'm not exactly sure what is gained from picking apart a text by enumerating the seemingly infinite codes and connotations within it. Barthes assures us at length,
It seems to me that starring the text contradictorily both de-structures and restructures the text, excessively on both fronts. Is it really necessary to take up a project of explicating absolutely all of what can be inferred from the text (like, say, definitions of actions, symbols, culturally-specific facts)? (Also, why have most but not all the instances of "signifier" been changed to "signified" on pages 16-19 in our copy of the reading?)
My bigger curiosity is what better or more efficient means of knowledge apprehension there may be apart from a hermeneutic approach to a text, such as the one Barthes so skillfully displays. For instance, only convention requires us to read an English text from left to right and top to bottom. Were I to read (or even "write") random words from any place in the text and move on non-linearly, Barthes' starred codes would hardly apply. Another instance of ambiguous signification is shown plainly by Barthes: how is meaning transformed by the act of direct quotation? He gives a "tauromachian" explanation of citation (22-23) which I can't exactly make sense of.
...to study this text down to the last detail is to take up the structural analysis of narrative where it has been left till now: at the major structures; it is to assume the power...of working back along the threads of meanings, of abandoning no site of the signifier without endeavoring to ascertain the code or codes of which this site is perhaps the starting point (or the goal); it is...to substitute for the simple representative model another model, whose very gradualness would guarantee what may be productive in the classic text; for the step-by-step method, through its very slowness and dispersion, avoids penetrating, reversing the tutor text, giving an internal imag of it" it is never anything but the decomposition (in the cinematographic sense) of the work of reading: a slow motion, so to speak, neither wholly image nor wholly analysis; it is, finally, in the very writing of the commentary, a systematic use of digression (a form ill-accommodated by the discourse of knowledge) and thereby a way of observing the reversibility of the structures from which the text is woven; of course, the classic text is incompletely reversible (it is modestly plural): the reading of this text occurs within a necessary order, which the gradual analysis will make precisely its order in writing; but the step-by-step commentary is of necessity a renewal of the entrances to the text, it avoids structuring the text excessively, avoids giving it that additional structure which would come from a dissertation and would close it: it stars the text, instead of assembling it. (12-13)
It seems to me that starring the text contradictorily both de-structures and restructures the text, excessively on both fronts. Is it really necessary to take up a project of explicating absolutely all of what can be inferred from the text (like, say, definitions of actions, symbols, culturally-specific facts)? (Also, why have most but not all the instances of "signifier" been changed to "signified" on pages 16-19 in our copy of the reading?)
My bigger curiosity is what better or more efficient means of knowledge apprehension there may be apart from a hermeneutic approach to a text, such as the one Barthes so skillfully displays. For instance, only convention requires us to read an English text from left to right and top to bottom. Were I to read (or even "write") random words from any place in the text and move on non-linearly, Barthes' starred codes would hardly apply. Another instance of ambiguous signification is shown plainly by Barthes: how is meaning transformed by the act of direct quotation? He gives a "tauromachian" explanation of citation (22-23) which I can't exactly make sense of.
derrida, levi-strauss, and reassemblage
In The Violence of the Letter, Derrida critiques the ethnocentrism present in The Writing Lesson of Levi-Strauss. Derrida writes, "On the other hand- it is the other side of the same gesture-if Levi-Strauss constantly recognizes the pertinence of the division between peoples with and peoples without writing, this division is effaced by him from the moment that one might ethnocentrically wish to make it play a role in the reflection on history and on the respective values of cultures" (121). By saying that the Nambikwara could not write, only "draw lines" is critiqued when Derrida states "Is not ethnocentrism always betrayed by the haste with which it is satisfied by certain translations or certain domestic equivalents?" (123). It is not that the Nambikwara cannot "write," it is just that their form of "writing" is devalued based on an ethnocentric viewpoint brought by an anthropologist.
This tied into Trinh T. Minh-ha's film Reassemblage in the fact that Minh-ha's goal was not to "speak about" the Senegalese women, but rather to "speak nearby." It turns the tradition of ethnography and ethnocentrism on its head by not privilging one culture over another, even unintentionally. Minh-ha attempts to show the "facts" as they are, and not place value judgements on them. This "speaking nearby" is something that Levi-Strauss does not do, and something that Derrida calls him out on.
This tied into Trinh T. Minh-ha's film Reassemblage in the fact that Minh-ha's goal was not to "speak about" the Senegalese women, but rather to "speak nearby." It turns the tradition of ethnography and ethnocentrism on its head by not privilging one culture over another, even unintentionally. Minh-ha attempts to show the "facts" as they are, and not place value judgements on them. This "speaking nearby" is something that Levi-Strauss does not do, and something that Derrida calls him out on.
cross discipline connection
While trying to understand Barthes' thoughts on "interpretation", 'the broken text" and many other aspects of "From Work to Text" I remembered readings from an art history class. Carl Einstein wrote about his "problem" with Rodin and sculpture in general. Einstein wanted a new way to look at sculpture. He asserted that to understand a piece by Rodin you had to annihilate the materiality of the piece. The nature of Rodin's work -- the "modele" "thumbprintyness" of the piece forces viewers to bring it into present to see "the meaning". a better example of this, if you're not sure of why Rodin's work would need you to annihilate its materiality is pointillism. you have to ignore the fact that it is just little dots "to see" the painting--or do you? the painting is a collection of dots but also a picture created by the structure of those dots. Point and picture are mutually exclusive, but paradoxically contingent upon one and other. as a viewer you have to choose a way to interpret what is in front of you-- I don't really remember the rest of what Einstein said, but I found the same dance around viewer and participation, materiality of the medium and meaning in Barthes work and it was helpful to think about these same questions in a more concrete way.
My short (open) texts….
1) Derrida’s contention that writing is the undervalued category in the writing/speech binary opposition appears to be a counter-intuitive and a(nti)-factual/historical move, in my view. The age-old proverb “Verba Volant, scripta manent” – that so well captures the privileging of writing over speech/the written “text” (not necessarily in the Derridean or Barthesian sense) over the spoken one – was imparted to me in early childhood and constantly repeated in school to me and my fellow classmates.
Beyond my personal experience and constructed “ideology” regarding writing/speech, I would like to refer to the "archive/repertoire" binary opposition that is so prominent in the emerging discipline of Performance Studies (scholar Diana Taylor, for example, wrote a book entitled precisely "The Archive and the Repertoire"). This opposition – connected primarily to an anxiety about the ephemerality and traceless-ness of speech/the “spoken word” (as well as of “incorporated” – as opposed to “inscribed” practices, to use Paul Connerton’s terminology), supports the “superiority” of writing over “speech”. Moreover, specific peoples (in Africa, the Americas) were denied “identity”/”history” in the course of “History” on the grounds that they lacked written records that would have entitled them to these.
The “rise of the public sphere” (Habermas) marked an age in which the emphasis on the writing became even more prominent, I would suggest. The contemporary world – in which everything happens in/through writing – has “inherited” this “obsession for the trace”.
After providing these “facts” in support of my argument, I will now re-consider Derrida’s fundamental claim about the writing/speech binary from a different perspective. As a purely intellectual construct, opening the category of writing to mean "ecriture" (the play of difference of language), Derrida’s claims become (for me) an intriguing, fascinating, and mysterious thought-experiment. Paradoxically, however, with the proliferation of Derridean theory (at least in the academic environment) and in politics – in a much distilled form, it appears that this “thought-experiment” has the potential of “actually” producing change into a factuality/reality that it (purposefully?) bracketed in/by Derrida.
2.1) The concept of “textuality” employed by Barthes seems to designate the quality of being a text. The question that intrigues me is whether this quality is inherent or extraneous, necessary or contingent. It appears to me that Barthes is particularly ambivalent with regard to this issue.
2.2) On page 156 of the essay ”From Work to Text”, Barthes states: “the combined action of Marxism, Freudianism and structuralism demands, in literature, the relativization of the relations of writer, reader, and observer (critic)”. The preservation of the three categories (“writer”, “reader”, “critic”) is surprising to me given Barthes’ proclamation of “the death of the author” and of the reader as producer. What need can there be for the critic if meaning (some meaning) is available for everyone and there is no such thing as “The Meaning” whom only the privileged critic is supposed to grasp?
The preservation of the critic as a distinct category in the equation of writing-reading appears to me to align Barthes with the New Critics who claimed that “Not everybody can do criticism.” (Ransom, “Criticism, Inc.”, 336), and, implicitly, that the critic can read “deeper” than the reader.
2.3) Can legality/the “Law” still retain its authority if text as a “methodological field” (as Prof. Doane defined it) is legitimated to the extent that it completely substitutes “the work”?
Beyond my personal experience and constructed “ideology” regarding writing/speech, I would like to refer to the "archive/repertoire" binary opposition that is so prominent in the emerging discipline of Performance Studies (scholar Diana Taylor, for example, wrote a book entitled precisely "The Archive and the Repertoire"). This opposition – connected primarily to an anxiety about the ephemerality and traceless-ness of speech/the “spoken word” (as well as of “incorporated” – as opposed to “inscribed” practices, to use Paul Connerton’s terminology), supports the “superiority” of writing over “speech”. Moreover, specific peoples (in Africa, the Americas) were denied “identity”/”history” in the course of “History” on the grounds that they lacked written records that would have entitled them to these.
The “rise of the public sphere” (Habermas) marked an age in which the emphasis on the writing became even more prominent, I would suggest. The contemporary world – in which everything happens in/through writing – has “inherited” this “obsession for the trace”.
After providing these “facts” in support of my argument, I will now re-consider Derrida’s fundamental claim about the writing/speech binary from a different perspective. As a purely intellectual construct, opening the category of writing to mean "ecriture" (the play of difference of language), Derrida’s claims become (for me) an intriguing, fascinating, and mysterious thought-experiment. Paradoxically, however, with the proliferation of Derridean theory (at least in the academic environment) and in politics – in a much distilled form, it appears that this “thought-experiment” has the potential of “actually” producing change into a factuality/reality that it (purposefully?) bracketed in/by Derrida.
2.1) The concept of “textuality” employed by Barthes seems to designate the quality of being a text. The question that intrigues me is whether this quality is inherent or extraneous, necessary or contingent. It appears to me that Barthes is particularly ambivalent with regard to this issue.
2.2) On page 156 of the essay ”From Work to Text”, Barthes states: “the combined action of Marxism, Freudianism and structuralism demands, in literature, the relativization of the relations of writer, reader, and observer (critic)”. The preservation of the three categories (“writer”, “reader”, “critic”) is surprising to me given Barthes’ proclamation of “the death of the author” and of the reader as producer. What need can there be for the critic if meaning (some meaning) is available for everyone and there is no such thing as “The Meaning” whom only the privileged critic is supposed to grasp?
The preservation of the critic as a distinct category in the equation of writing-reading appears to me to align Barthes with the New Critics who claimed that “Not everybody can do criticism.” (Ransom, “Criticism, Inc.”, 336), and, implicitly, that the critic can read “deeper” than the reader.
2.3) Can legality/the “Law” still retain its authority if text as a “methodological field” (as Prof. Doane defined it) is legitimated to the extent that it completely substitutes “the work”?
"Joint Presentation"
In his analysis of Sarrasine, Barthes points out various instances where the symbolic code applies to the short story. Of course, many of these antitheses do coalesce together, in a sense (youthful Marianina can touch the decrepit old man, meanwhile La Zambinella destroys the male/female dichotomy). But Barthes also notes in Sarrasine moments where a boundary between two parts of a binary opposition is not actually broken down, but is instead straddled. For example, Barthes calls to attention the mention of a window recess in the story: "recess, an intermediate place between garden and salon, death and life." (21)
How do these possibilities-- option A, or option B, or neither option, or maybe even both-- work in regards to who or what occupies them? Barthes mentions that the "joint presentation" can be used rhetorically to "introduce and summarize the antithesis" (21), but can that middle ground, that neutral space, be occupied as if it were a clearly defined pole or even perhaps the space which is left when the dichotomy breaks down?
How do these possibilities-- option A, or option B, or neither option, or maybe even both-- work in regards to who or what occupies them? Barthes mentions that the "joint presentation" can be used rhetorically to "introduce and summarize the antithesis" (21), but can that middle ground, that neutral space, be occupied as if it were a clearly defined pole or even perhaps the space which is left when the dichotomy breaks down?
Friday, February 20, 2009
02/19 Lecture: Power and Knowledge
It was my first impression that the lecture from today accounted Foucault’s essay seemed different and somewhat departed from my initial understanding when I was reading. However, I also have to admit that I had so much confusion at the first time, but the lecture’s presentation of his ideas from different angle (at least, different for me) had me understand better and help me to absolve some questions.
I was wondering what the relationship between power and knowledge can be defined or even just explicated as Foucault put a great emphasis on their almost interchangeable nature. Is power ubiquitous? How could he have come to a definite conclusion that power is always positive?
First, I begin with knowledge: how is knowledge obtained (or learned)? Although I personally cannot give a precise definition of knowledge, I almost certainly believe that knowledge is exchanged and transferred as a form of semiotics. In other words, in order for one to learn about a fact or even just to recognize the other person’s idea, information or any “knowledge”, it is required for them to communicate with some sort of medium that they both can understand and recognize. In this sense, (possible that I am stretching) power is everywhere because as far as I know there are no people without language. The omnipotent nature of power becomes more evident when considering “discourse”. While people are conversing, one may present an idea or possibly something only existed within oneself. The other person in front of him would learn; now, the knowledge that was only one’s becomes available to another. As this process of building knowledge through medium of language, Foucault’s claim that power is always positive seems to be correct to me. Just logically thinking without employing Foucault’s explanation, I think of power as force that is exerted with an expectation to have some kind of outcome. Outcome can be negative, positive, or even neutral; however, power certainly works only in one direction. First, I thought it is not even logical to say power is positive or negative. But, when considering the nature of power first being ubiquitous and second something exerted, it is always positive.
Even I now understand and mostly agree with Foucault, there is still a question. As I personally believe that things that are not tangible like emotion, characteristics, virtue and etc. are defined by relativity and opposition, I wonder if power can be defined in the same way.
I was wondering what the relationship between power and knowledge can be defined or even just explicated as Foucault put a great emphasis on their almost interchangeable nature. Is power ubiquitous? How could he have come to a definite conclusion that power is always positive?
First, I begin with knowledge: how is knowledge obtained (or learned)? Although I personally cannot give a precise definition of knowledge, I almost certainly believe that knowledge is exchanged and transferred as a form of semiotics. In other words, in order for one to learn about a fact or even just to recognize the other person’s idea, information or any “knowledge”, it is required for them to communicate with some sort of medium that they both can understand and recognize. In this sense, (possible that I am stretching) power is everywhere because as far as I know there are no people without language. The omnipotent nature of power becomes more evident when considering “discourse”. While people are conversing, one may present an idea or possibly something only existed within oneself. The other person in front of him would learn; now, the knowledge that was only one’s becomes available to another. As this process of building knowledge through medium of language, Foucault’s claim that power is always positive seems to be correct to me. Just logically thinking without employing Foucault’s explanation, I think of power as force that is exerted with an expectation to have some kind of outcome. Outcome can be negative, positive, or even neutral; however, power certainly works only in one direction. First, I thought it is not even logical to say power is positive or negative. But, when considering the nature of power first being ubiquitous and second something exerted, it is always positive.
Even I now understand and mostly agree with Foucault, there is still a question. As I personally believe that things that are not tangible like emotion, characteristics, virtue and etc. are defined by relativity and opposition, I wonder if power can be defined in the same way.
Like Caitlin, I also took interest in Foucault’s idea of punishment. The fact that he made the punishment types site specific, however, was misleading. Although Caitlin mentioned that his main focus was on the body, I found that Foucault’s idea of “authority” was the true site source in that all punishments occurred within society. While Foucault uses the term “site” to describe the effect the punishment had on the victim, the ultimate effect of these punishments is on society itself. It seems that society inflicts a certain pain upon itself, perhaps through the individual, yet eventually on the public in the public sphere. In this sense, it seems difficult to claim any sort of progression. While the punishment types may vary, the cycle of society producing punishments and these punishments becoming mainstays in society continues. This phenomenon, while taking place within society, has the ability to affect body, soul, and mind, despite the specific punishment type.
Thursday, February 19, 2009
(Post)modern Discipline
Foucault introduces Bentham's Panopticon in the context of a plague-ridden society:
I wonder whether the U.S. government, in an "exercise of disciplinary power," constructs or attempts to reify imagined "plagues" to keep our society in order. "Panopticism" created an interesting dialogue with "The Body of the Condemned" to show the institutionalized rhetorical control over the way we (can) think of crime and criminals themselves. Two examples that come to mind are the war on drugs and increasing legislation meant to control digital piracy. We are brought up to believe in the power of police/authoritative oversight on illegal transactions. Pervasive supervision incurs the threat of incarceration for the purchase of illegal drugs or peer-to-peer file-sharing, for example. Obviously, this surveillance is imperfect, since drugs are bought, files shared, and even, against Foucault's illustration of "power reduced to its ideal form," exam answers shared in school.
This begs the question of whether--and when--Panoptic power ceases to be useful (say, according to certain institutional limits of size and influence). Certainly power no longer functions at the lowest possible cost, nor does it function at "maximum intensity" (218), as evidenced by relatively easy workarounds (either within institutions, as in drug trades in which providers are complicit, or illegal file/information sharing for ostensibly "allowable" purposes, within educational or governmental structures).
As resistance continues to bubble up from inside and between these complex structures of institutional and discursive power, one must wonder whether a policy of complete visibility at the threat of incarceration or defamation is the best for either party, watching or watched.
The plague-stricken town, traversed throughout with hierarchy, surveillance, observation, writing; the town immobilized by the functioning of an extensive power that bears in a distinct way over all individual bodies--this is the utopia of the perfectly governed city. The plague (envisaged as a possibility at least) is the trial in the course of which one may define ideally the exercise of disciplinary power. (198)
I wonder whether the U.S. government, in an "exercise of disciplinary power," constructs or attempts to reify imagined "plagues" to keep our society in order. "Panopticism" created an interesting dialogue with "The Body of the Condemned" to show the institutionalized rhetorical control over the way we (can) think of crime and criminals themselves. Two examples that come to mind are the war on drugs and increasing legislation meant to control digital piracy. We are brought up to believe in the power of police/authoritative oversight on illegal transactions. Pervasive supervision incurs the threat of incarceration for the purchase of illegal drugs or peer-to-peer file-sharing, for example. Obviously, this surveillance is imperfect, since drugs are bought, files shared, and even, against Foucault's illustration of "power reduced to its ideal form," exam answers shared in school.
This begs the question of whether--and when--Panoptic power ceases to be useful (say, according to certain institutional limits of size and influence). Certainly power no longer functions at the lowest possible cost, nor does it function at "maximum intensity" (218), as evidenced by relatively easy workarounds (either within institutions, as in drug trades in which providers are complicit, or illegal file/information sharing for ostensibly "allowable" purposes, within educational or governmental structures).
As resistance continues to bubble up from inside and between these complex structures of institutional and discursive power, one must wonder whether a policy of complete visibility at the threat of incarceration or defamation is the best for either party, watching or watched.
"Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the machine: in the absence of the director, his family, his friends, his visitors, even his servants (Bentham, 45). Similarly, it does not matter what motive animates him: the curiosity of the indiscreet, the malice of a child, the thirst for knowledge of a philosopher who wishes to visit this museum of human nature, or the perversity of those who take pleasure in spying and punishing" (Panopticism, 202).
This passage brings up the concept of punishment in the Panopticon; Foucault states that anyone is capable of inflicting punishment. However, this brought to mind the question: are the captives aware of the possibility of punishment and to what extent? Do they know what punishment is waiting for them if they were to step out of line, and furthermore, what could they do to merit punishment? If each person is in total isolation, what action is he capable of to deserve punishment? If, hypothetically, no punishment were to exist, does the overseer have any power at all? Or is his constant observation punishment enough, or enough to ensure that no punishment is necessary? I do not know the answer to any of these questions, yet all point to the same overarching one: Is there authority without the possibility of inflicting punishment?
Communication
Discourse on sexuality seems to have materialized as a way to combat perversions that run counter to social norms without censoring them. Punishment would then work in the same way; the emphasis is placed on acknowledging perceived problems and the disciplines necessary for reform. It strikes me that these reformations, these acts of molding, all focus on the body (even when we're not talking about torture that explicitly focuses on the tangible body) because these bodies can be used as vessels of communication. Perhaps then discipline is so focused on the body because the soul and mind rely on it to exist;
Foucault also mentions that a person is defined by their actions; a person who commits is a crime is defined primarily as a criminal, making the person "faceless." In what way does that facilitate individualism? Is it because disciplinary procedures then need to be so focused on the individual, establishing subjectivity? At first glance, defining a person by only one facet of their personality (for lack of a better word) and thus defining the individual seems almost paradoxical.
Foucault also mentions that a person is defined by their actions; a person who commits is a crime is defined primarily as a criminal, making the person "faceless." In what way does that facilitate individualism? Is it because disciplinary procedures then need to be so focused on the individual, establishing subjectivity? At first glance, defining a person by only one facet of their personality (for lack of a better word) and thus defining the individual seems almost paradoxical.
Questions
Foucault mentions that "pleasure and power do not cancel or turn back against one another; they seek out, overlap and reinforce one another. They are linked together by complex mechanisms and devices of excitation and incitement." I agree with that statement, and wonder whether the relationship between power and pain is the same? The reading on punishment suggests that modern punitive practices wished to distance the relationship between power and pain--at least superficially. its seems that there was a redefinition of pain, and a more complex understanding of power that, similar to the proliferation of sources in sexuality the distribution of power/pain allowed a discourse that incorporated a self knowledge? This is a stretch I realize, but I think it is interesting to think Foucault's description of knowledge/power relationship and power/pain/pleasure relationship and the possible pain/pleasure/knowledge extrapolation that could follow that line of argument.
Discourses
1 – Morality and Physicality
I find the readings from Foucault particularly interesting as they appear to entail an indissoluble relationship between morality/the moral(1) and physicality: morality seems to “happen” on and to the body. Even though Foucault poses the question “What would a non-corporeal punishment be?” (16) – implying the possibility of a morality not grounded in the body – and proposes disciplinary practices (of modernity) as belonging to this category (of "non-corporeal practices"), I would argue that not even in this case is “the body” in any way bracketed or rendered less important. In the final analysis, disciplinary practices involve/are about a specific positioning of the body in relation to which morality is negotiated and established(2). Such an account places morality – traditionally associated with transcendence, stability, fixity, and a claim to universality – in the domain of the shifting power relations. This is, in my view, a potentially fruitful, though intriguing move, implying that the knowledge and mastery that Foucault calls “the political technology of the body” (26) could be employed as a means of investigation for gaining insights into the formation and functioning of morality within specific societies.
Thus, I would suggest, Foucault’s argument might presuppose a (perhaps unintended) reconsideration of the traditional notion of morality.
Notes
1 Following Ricoeur, I distinguish between ethics – an investigation into the domain of the “good life”, and morality – specific behaviors dictated by specific norms that are supposed to approximate the “good life”
2 I would like to draw attention that I believe – in the same line with Foucault – that morality and disciplinary practices are distinct from one another. In my view, these are also mutually inclusive categories. It is not clear to me, however, if Foucault allows for a connection between the two, or whether he denies it when he asserts: “hence the persistence in regarding them as the humble, but concrete form of every morality, whereas they are a set of physico-political techniques” (223)
2 - Discourse/Sexuality/ Actuality
Foucault’s account of (the mechanism of) sexuality is fascinating because of its (apparently paradoxical, in my view) implications. On the one hand, “the transformation of sex into discourse” (36) (a kind of “virtualization” of sexuality in a sense, perhaps) seems to be a strategy for neutralizing “bad” sexuality in social contexts in which this conflicted with dominant codes of behavior: “in order to gain mastery over it in reality, it had first been forced to subjugate it at the level of language” (17). Ironically, however, the move into discourse appears to have concrete consequences such as “sexual heterogeneities”, “a dispersion of sexualities” (36). More interestingly, the relation between language and the actual phenomenon of “multiplication of sexualities” (37) seems to be causal. A cyclical relationship possibly emerges, in which actuality/reality transforms discourse and discourse, in turn, changes actuality/reality.
This leap from discourse to actuality – however implausible it might seem – is, in my view, an intellectually appealing thought-experiment, attesting, to a certain extent, to the creative potential of language.
I find the readings from Foucault particularly interesting as they appear to entail an indissoluble relationship between morality/the moral(1) and physicality: morality seems to “happen” on and to the body. Even though Foucault poses the question “What would a non-corporeal punishment be?” (16) – implying the possibility of a morality not grounded in the body – and proposes disciplinary practices (of modernity) as belonging to this category (of "non-corporeal practices"), I would argue that not even in this case is “the body” in any way bracketed or rendered less important. In the final analysis, disciplinary practices involve/are about a specific positioning of the body in relation to which morality is negotiated and established(2). Such an account places morality – traditionally associated with transcendence, stability, fixity, and a claim to universality – in the domain of the shifting power relations. This is, in my view, a potentially fruitful, though intriguing move, implying that the knowledge and mastery that Foucault calls “the political technology of the body” (26) could be employed as a means of investigation for gaining insights into the formation and functioning of morality within specific societies.
Thus, I would suggest, Foucault’s argument might presuppose a (perhaps unintended) reconsideration of the traditional notion of morality.
Notes
1 Following Ricoeur, I distinguish between ethics – an investigation into the domain of the “good life”, and morality – specific behaviors dictated by specific norms that are supposed to approximate the “good life”
2 I would like to draw attention that I believe – in the same line with Foucault – that morality and disciplinary practices are distinct from one another. In my view, these are also mutually inclusive categories. It is not clear to me, however, if Foucault allows for a connection between the two, or whether he denies it when he asserts: “hence the persistence in regarding them as the humble, but concrete form of every morality, whereas they are a set of physico-political techniques” (223)
2 - Discourse/Sexuality/ Actuality
Foucault’s account of (the mechanism of) sexuality is fascinating because of its (apparently paradoxical, in my view) implications. On the one hand, “the transformation of sex into discourse” (36) (a kind of “virtualization” of sexuality in a sense, perhaps) seems to be a strategy for neutralizing “bad” sexuality in social contexts in which this conflicted with dominant codes of behavior: “in order to gain mastery over it in reality, it had first been forced to subjugate it at the level of language” (17). Ironically, however, the move into discourse appears to have concrete consequences such as “sexual heterogeneities”, “a dispersion of sexualities” (36). More interestingly, the relation between language and the actual phenomenon of “multiplication of sexualities” (37) seems to be causal. A cyclical relationship possibly emerges, in which actuality/reality transforms discourse and discourse, in turn, changes actuality/reality.
This leap from discourse to actuality – however implausible it might seem – is, in my view, an intellectually appealing thought-experiment, attesting, to a certain extent, to the creative potential of language.
Thursday, February 12, 2009
response to Ioana
Ioana,
I think your first question is fascinating because it demands that we contextualize Levi Strauss through a greater examination of what might constitute the modern condition of intellectual thought. it seems that there was a shift from the search for reason and meaning in the world or at least ways to understand culture and society, to other objectives or ideals, and structuralism was certainly one of those. In light of modernity's disorienting power the literal structure with which to view the world must have seemed to Levi-Strauss completely necessary even if just on a rudimentary level.
As to the relationship between reason and structure, to say that they both serve to find or create meaning or "sense", is to overlook the shift in intellectual thought that began this discussion. if you abandon the notion that there is reason, or a rational process that governs culture you are in a sense abandoning the need and desire to make sense but not the desire to understand. the difference between these two principles is maybe (this could be entirely wrong) the same dialectic that lies behind the Freudian concept of the uncanny-- the push and pull between the world your know and one that is entirely unfamiliar--the unfamiliarity produced by a world where humans cannot be the source of reason.
I think your first question is fascinating because it demands that we contextualize Levi Strauss through a greater examination of what might constitute the modern condition of intellectual thought. it seems that there was a shift from the search for reason and meaning in the world or at least ways to understand culture and society, to other objectives or ideals, and structuralism was certainly one of those. In light of modernity's disorienting power the literal structure with which to view the world must have seemed to Levi-Strauss completely necessary even if just on a rudimentary level.
As to the relationship between reason and structure, to say that they both serve to find or create meaning or "sense", is to overlook the shift in intellectual thought that began this discussion. if you abandon the notion that there is reason, or a rational process that governs culture you are in a sense abandoning the need and desire to make sense but not the desire to understand. the difference between these two principles is maybe (this could be entirely wrong) the same dialectic that lies behind the Freudian concept of the uncanny-- the push and pull between the world your know and one that is entirely unfamiliar--the unfamiliarity produced by a world where humans cannot be the source of reason.
Screening: Reassemblage
Although I should have paid more attention to underlying meanings to this film, as I go over my notes from the screening section, it seems that I was more attracted by the techniques and some of the details intentionally inserted by the director. First, the film starts with somewhat exotic and at the same time chaotic sound without any visual presentation except total darkness. This seems to disorient viewers from their usual surrounding and take them to a new world. In fact, when some visual presentation takes a part, the setting is in Senegal, Africa; however, this time, there is no background sound (once again, this is not usual for the viewers). There is a narration in English with a voice of a woman. When she narrates, there is still visual presentation, but no sound. The subject of this film becomes more apparent as the film processes. The camera lens seems to have focused on the activities of women in Senegal, possibly including the social and matrimonial expectations. Thereby, the film accounts the social status of Women in Senegal. Repetition and use of jump-cuts visually translates the boredom and mundane life.
ruminations
Upon first viewing "Reassemblage" I have to admit that I left List feeling very confused about what I had just watched. While trying to place the film in the ethnographic genre, in watching the film, I found myself slightly troubled by how I should interpret the multiple focuses on the Senegalese women (in particular their breasts) in the film. Should I interpret it as a male gaze in the spirit of Mulvey? But then again, the film is made by a woman manufacturing the film through a feminist film studio (Women Make Movies), so maybe it's more of an empowering statement. However, Minh-ha's point started to come across with her voice over stating, roughly, that a couple go to see an anthropological film and afterwards the husband shamefully turns to his wife and says that he is not sure if he witnessed an ethnography or a pornography. Here Minh-ha does a great critique of the traditional ethnographic images of naked tribal women, and brings into question what is "art" and what is "pornography." In fact, in that light, her whole film becomes a critique of how ethnography is presented and her film does a great job in highlighting stereotypes, discrepancies and generalizations that are present in many ethnographic films.
Does Levi-Strauss directly equate mythology with exogamy at all? If women represent signs for communication that are to be exchanged outside of a group, then they're used as links to a social world. Myth appears to work similarly in that it is constructed to meet a communication goal, in this case rationalization. Both are further equated with language (though perhaps speech or discourse would be a better term) in that they contain elements that on their own are insignificant but gain meaning when all elements are viewed as a whole.
However, Levi-Strauss rejected the notion that myths serve primarily social functions and were instead logical, while exogamy and the incest taboo do seem social (though perhaps not in construct--can a social function originate from a universal construct?) Do mythology and exogamy serve similar purposes despite their apparently different (to me) goals?
On another note, where do other rationalizations against the incest taboo fit into Levi-Strauss' proposal, even if they are not universal as he claims the exogamy rationalization is?
However, Levi-Strauss rejected the notion that myths serve primarily social functions and were instead logical, while exogamy and the incest taboo do seem social (though perhaps not in construct--can a social function originate from a universal construct?) Do mythology and exogamy serve similar purposes despite their apparently different (to me) goals?
On another note, where do other rationalizations against the incest taboo fit into Levi-Strauss' proposal, even if they are not universal as he claims the exogamy rationalization is?
Comments on "Structure"
I found that there were many points in Benveniste's discussion of "structure" in linguistics that deserve further investigation. In his summary of Saussure's view of the systematic nature of language, he points out that any sign in isolation, that is without the context of a system, is characterized only by its lack of significance. This parallels the structuralist view in neuropsychology of "top-down" vs. "bottom-up" analyses; using the brain as an example, it is clear that each tiny segment of neuronal fiber is completely without function when isolated from its concomitants. The paralleled shift in linguistics from historical analysis to intrinsic structuralism shows that while each sign is always arbitrary, there is no diachronic basis for their incorporation into the system. They come together and function because that is all they have been known to do. Benveniste goes on to say that "certain combinations are frequent, others fairly rare, and still others, while theoretically possible, are never realized." It is important understand to what degree we are able to hypothesize about what is "theoretically possible" in language, and what elements of the structural approach are indeed intrinsic in our conception of discourse.
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