Everything/Nothing

“Thus, what they desire is precisely nothing, and at the same time everything. (…) Their desire is often interpreted, and feared, as a sort of insatiable hunger, a voracity that will swallow you whole.” (29)

Interestingly, in Irigaray woman (the feminine) is not denied either pleasure (on the contrary, "she" is, in a certain sense, almost polymorphously perverse - "woman has sex organs more or less everywhere" - 28, much like the child in the early stages of development of his/her sexuality in Freud's account ) or desire (this is in contrast to the position of other scholars - such as Mary Ann Doane, for example, for whom the woman only has "the desire to desire", precisely because she is denied any autonomous representation). In fact, it appears to me that desire (and pleasure) is the principle around which Irigaray’s entire discourse is organized. The problem with “the feminine” therefore becomes (for Irigaray) that, in a phallocentric society, the woman does no longer have an autonomous desire (“she will not say what she herself wants; moreover, she does not know, or no longer knows, what she wants.” - 25).

Even though I find Irigaray’s discourse fascinating and the strategic essentialism and mimicry (mimetisme) she employs, useful strategies, I believe that the organization of the discourse around the principle of desire is a weak point in her undertaking. “An Ethics of Sexual Difference” appears to be necessarily a sort of hedonistic ethics – in which attaining the greatest quantity of the greatest autonomous desire seems to be the highest goal and the defining characteristic of “a good life”.

Although I am aware (yet, not certain) that the desire principle is intimately intertwined with the psycho-analytic discourse in general, I would suggest that its replacement with another “goal” would be a possible solution for the problem of “the feminine” and its “lacks”.

Similarly, I realize (though, again, I am not certain) that the inscription of Irigaray’s discourse within the framework of psycho-analysis might require this move, but I am, nevertheless, intrigued by the fact that acceptance/refusal (resistance) is not a functioning binary in Irigaray. The woman never says “NO”: she never resists the representation that is being imposed upon her (although “she resists all definition” - 26). Nor does she play it! On the one hand, because of the postulated plurality of the sexuality (doubtful though it is, either as a fact of nature, or of culture) – because “woman is always touching herself”, she is necessarily continuously subversive (she does not respect the “taboo against touching of a highly obsessive civilization” - 27). On the other hand, the woman is necessarily continuously mysterious (28). These two aspects represent potential positions /sources of power, I would claim. The problem (and cause of the perpetual feminine subjection) is perhaps that the woman always plays the victim instead of playing the difference.

Notes

In her account, Irigaray does not attribute “the” (definite article) to “woman” (perhaps in order to suggest that the feminine has no determination). I believe this to be a reinforcement of a/the “phallocentric order”. For this reason – as you might have already noticed – I am using “the woman” in my post.

For me, strategic essentialism and mimicry (mimetisme) are instances of playing the difference.

I believe that the question "Does this critique of Freud go so far as to challenge psychoanalytic theory and practice?" posed to Irigaray in "The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine" interview (72) justly (though implicitly) points to the necessity of re-considering the fundamental tenets of psychoanalysis (as a theoretical body). It appears to me that - without this necessary reassessment - programmatically working in the domain of psychoanalysis involves the acceptance of several inevitable foundational principles that prevent the development of diverse directions of thought and eventually lead to circular arguments.

Question Marks

Why is/should “the alternative between a defensive virginity, fiercely turned in upon itself, and a body open to penetration” (24) (be) “impossible” ?

Why does Riddles of the Sphinx (which I found aesthetically fascinating) propose the necessity of giving up the Mother-position? In my view, this is a most unreasonable move and an instance of NOT-playing the difference that might result in the enforcement of feminine subjection. (Matriarchy, I would argue, was grounded precisely in the acknowledgment of the privileged role of woman as child-bearer)

This Sex Which Is Not One

To be honest, when first encountering this essay, I was highly puzzled as it is true that my own notion of sexuality or feminism has been vague and I did not hold any clear understanding of it. As Emily points out, when Irigaray asserts that men needs instruments including "his hands, women's body, and language..." (24). And afterward, the author explains how a woman is able to touch herself without an instrument unlike men. However, what had me extremly intrigued comes from the relationship between the two opposite sex. As Irigaray claims that female "sexuality has always been conceptualized on the basis of masculine parameters", is it that men serves as an agent to give rise to women's sexuality? Or, while woman's body serves as men's instrument, can men be woman's mediator in finding and realizing her sexuality?

Kristeva mentions on pages 14-15 of her essay two "methods" that allow women to gain power; the first involves women gaining power within a society and assimilating to that power structure, and the second seems more related to women creating a parallel countersociety where feminism has the potential to become inverted and sexist itself. When women assimilate to a system's power structure and essentially become part of the patriarchy, it seems to me a sign that they cannot escape the system because of how ingrained those patriarchal views are within it. In the second example, where women form their own counterpower, can they be said to have escaped the system? I'm personally inclined to say no, as she then goes on to say that "the very logic of counterpower and of countersociety necessarily generates, by its very structure, its essence as a simulacrum of the combated society or of power." [16] So if neither can be entirely divorced from a patriarchal society, what does that say about the nature of the system--does it support the belief that it springs fully formed at once, and its origin is impossible to trace? What does this mean for Freud, Lacan, and Irigaray? How does this idea (if accurate, but perhaps it isn't) mesh with their theories?

I find Irigary's use of the parenthetical their, in the last sentence of This Sex Which is Not One, very confusing and somewhat hypocritical. As a modifier of place it must connote a hierarchy and as such it seems to defeat the purpose of the whole essay. Is that a conscious addition as part of the inevitable that she alludes to, or is it a factor of her own place in the phallocratism?

"In order to touch himself, man needs an instrument: his hand, a woman's body, language..."

(Irigaray, 24)

This sentence in This Sex Which Is Not One seemed odd when i first read it. Even now, I can't quite figure out what Irigaray meant when she wrote this; how does a man 'touch himself' with language? The immediate association I made was to Saussure's conception of language as a system. Through this analysis, Irigaray is almost comparing a woman's body and a system. This made me wonder: can a body in fact be called a system? Or, can sexuality be called a system?

Coming from a Gender & Sexuality Studies background, I found the film for this week, The Riddle of the Sphinx, to be extremely intriguing. I found it to be a great critique of patriarchy and demonstrates the "othering" of women. The scene taking place in the kitchen, where the female protagonist, who you only view from the midsection is making food is especially great in my opinion. The voice over of the repetition of tasks brought the old axiom "A women's work is never done" to my mind as we see this woman preparing a meal, cleaning the dishes, taking care of her child, all while her husbands leans against the counter eating the crusts from the piece of bread that the protagonist has prepared. Another interesting thought that could be extrapolated from this scene is since we do not see the faces of the adults it is almost like we are viewing this scene from the perspective of a child, thus seeing how the dominant discourse of "proper" gender roles can be reproduced through unintentional teaching.

The film brought up some greats points regarding feminitiy and feminism, such as the one shown above, but also others like the woman's "double duty" (being able to work outside the home but still being expected to do every household task as well) and the male gaze in cinema (the acrobatic scene, while kinda trippy simply portrays a women doing acrobatic/vaguely sexual acts alone on the screen). While at first I thought the film was too farfetched for me, in hindsight I see the relevant points it was attempting to bring up.

In response to Emily’s thoughts, I think someone who has knowledge of the Freudian interpretation of dreams, when lucid dreaming, would try to control the manifest content of the dream in such a way as to escape the normal psychoanalytic analysis of dreams. The conscious would direct the person to switch the contents so that the usual analysis would not point to the actual anxiety-causing factor in the unconscious. The person would be aware of the effects of displacement, condensation, etc., and realizing how the manifest content would refer to the latent, would direct the content to be something else. The shifts and switches a lucid dreamer makes, however, probably also stem from what is going on in the unconscious, only adding another layer of repressed thoughts to analyzed. Knowing that the subject was lucid dreaming, Freud would probably analyze the dream deeper, ultimately leading to the true latent content. In Freudian analysis of dreams, I don’t think one would ever be able to escape being analyzed in these terms.

I am also interested in Caitlin's question of where a metaphor appears initially. As stated in class, however, under Freud, anything can function as a metaphor as it has more to do with substitution. If this were the case, the notion of a relationship between two objects would not be important until after the fact. At the same time, does a substitution occur at complete random and, if not, is there a connection (reminiscent of a relationship) made unconsciously? It seems that for Lacan, the relationship is primary and only through the relationship can a significance between two objects arise and determine language.

Do Freud and Lacan's theories oppose each other? It would seem that they do but no such opposition was mentioned in class. I suppose for Freud the physical precedes the psychological and for Lacan the psychological precedes the physical and, in making the relationship between the two theories of Freud and Lacan, readers must be wary which model they use.

Answering Questions

Let me give my opinion on some of the people's response or attempt to come up with an answer to the questions proposed.

Firstly, I absolutely agree to Ryan's commentary raised from his deep impression about Lacan's Mirror Stage. I also found this explanation very helpful and illustrative that I better understood. However, Ryan seemed to question about the role of the third person and the necessity of the person being a mother as it was specifically provided as mother in Lacan's essay. In my point of view, first of all, I do not believe that it does not matter whoever is working as an agent to make a baby aware of his/her subjectivity. The point from this analysis is that baby is not able to acknowledge the image as his or her own image reflected. That being said, it is important that there is someone like a mother figure to help the little baby out.

Secondly, I do not think that I can "answer" the question, but would like to give my personal response to the questions raised by Ioana: Are human beings necessarily assigned the positions of “subject”, “ego”, “other” (of Lacan’s “quadrature of the ego’s verifications”, 4), or could “things” also be an option? (the position of “things” is arguably assigned to women in classic Hollywood films, for example, I would suggest). I believe that the first question itself is not valid. Human beings are not assigned the positions of subject. However, they create subjectivity, ego, etc; thus, not passively. Human beings would assign concept of subject and ego from their presence, while actively developing their ego. Talking about the second part, I would like to say "things" could be an option. Especially when you are talking of a person who is not present at the instance of discourse, it is more prevalent.

My question has to deal with Lacan's mirror stage concept and something that Professor Doane brought up in lecture on Tuesday. As the child looks at its image in the mirror, it cannot distinguish that this reflection is actually an image of itself. It takes the mother confirming that this image is in fact the child to create this sense of subjectivity. However, this does not fit in the mold of every family, so to speak, as there is not always a mother present in any given family structure to confirm things to the child. Is the mother a necessity in Lacan's argument? Or could any parental type figure do the same confirming action that the "mother" does?

Something that struck me as particularly interesting from lecture today was when Prof. Doane talked about how a dream is only available to the analyst through the patient's recounting of the dream; the words chosen to describe the dream are of the utmost importance. This got me thinking about lucid dreaming: when one records or recounts dreams regularly, it becomes easier and easier to control one's own actions in, and outcomes of dreams. How would a lucid dream be able to be psycho-analyzed? When one is having a lucid dream, are one's own choices determined by the conscious or the unconscious? Furthermore, would Freud even think that lucid dreaming is a real phenomenon?

On Lacan in a “new” style

I – tempted, intrigued, and inspired as I was by Lacan to find new styles of writing that challenge the conventional ones – will post a rather un-systematic response to this week’s readings:

1 – When reading the following passage from Lacan (“it is the whole structure of language that psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious”, 139), I had the following “in-sight”: one of the implications of the assertion that the unconscious is structured as a language is that the unconscious – instead of being an “unruly” amalgam of most diverse elements, as I had previously conceived of it, possibly due to the randomness, unpredictability, and fragmentation of its manifestations into the conscious – has a structure, which implies that it is strictly ordered, which implies that there are a set of in-variable principles that govern it (the unconscious). Moreover, the notion of “structure” suggests to me a unity, a whole, which makes me re-consider my understanding of the idea of the split subject that Lacan proposes.

2 – Does Lacan’s theory presuppose a kind of determinism?
The formulation that “language, with its structure, exists prior to each subject’s entry into language” (139) suggests, in my view, that it does.

3 – In the lecture on Thursday, Prof. Doane called attention to the following passage from The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious: “The point is not to know whether I speak of myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather to know whether, when I speak of myself, I am the same as the self of whom I speak.” (156)
Aware though I am that this might be a stretch, I will propose the following reading of Lacan’s assertion: the speaking by/of the being induces the variability (/instability) of being. Simpl(isticall)y put, perhaps the subject is changed with every single utterance that the subject itself (what irony!) makes. The subject acts through language onto itself. The subject that speaks induces its own inconstancy and division.

4 – Another “in-sight”: The “I” is necessarily constituted as Other from the very “beginning” – Lacan’s account of the Mirror Stage suggests.
(Socrates’ fundamental imperative for a good life – “Know thyself” – is rendered irrelevant by Lacan’s proposition)

5 – The illustration that Lacan proposes in the place of that of Saussure (on page 143 of The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious) is intellectually appealing, but not a working formula: it completely disregards the fact that there is another case – the norm – in which Suassure’s model would be perfectly workable (gentlemen – corresponding image of the male body; ladies – corresponding image of the female body). It is worth mentioning in this respect that, in the example Lacan offers, the “gentlemen” and “ladies” are usually accompanied by representations of the male and the female’s bodies (stuck on the doors), respectively. Thus, the illustration that Lacan proposes is a “parasite” one, the exception.

6 – Lacan’s theory offers the perfect justification for the necessity of theatre/ performance. It is no surprise that his propositions have been undertaken in the discourse of Performance Studies.

7 – Are human beings necessarily assigned the positions of “subject”, “ego”, “other” (of Lacan’s “quadrature of the ego’s verifications”, 4), or could “things” also be an option? (the position of “things” is arguably assigned to women in classic Hollywood films, for example, I would suggest)

To be continued ….

As being defined by both symptom and myth, is woman abject? and if so where does that place her? does this imply that there are other symbolic systems, as it seems like there are a number of allusions to in Rose?

Metaphor and Metonymy

I was wondering about something that was mentioned today during lecture. Lacan believed that a comparison of sorts had to be made first before something could take on the other object's meanings (the actress/star example Professor Doane used). If this is then the case, that the metaphor is formed and then takes on other meanings, how do we get the metaphor in the first place? What compels a person/speaker/writer to make such a connection in the first place if the meanings are not already related? Is the metaphor then completely arbitrary, and if so, how can it be?

(On a slightly unrelated note, I find it interesting that the word metonymy means literally "change of name." Since the signifier and the signified don't touch in a metonymy--which actually confused me at first, because I thought of the two as being rather reliant on each other--it is perhaps logical that the two concepts remain separated by that bar; the change of name, such as White House meaning President, seems to hint at no overlap, but maybe just a slippage. It refers back to the shifting desire, which can't be satisfied exactly because there is no overlap.)

In lecture professor Doane mentioned that desire has no stable object, that there is always metonymic movement of displacement. This seems contradictory to me. Isn't the a basis of Freud's concept of sexuality that men always desire their mothers? From that enduring and most stable "fact" their whole lives are spent finding a replacement. So it is precisely because of the most stable object that the metonymic substitutions ensue.

Professor Doane said in class today that in Vertigo, the eye is an erotogenic zone. I understand how the eye plays a crucial role in the film; Scottie’s scopophilia, the audience’s voyeurism, Scottie’s vertigo (“dysfunction of eye in relation to space”) can all be traced back to a function of the eye. However, I don’t fully understand how that makes the eye an erotogenic zone when Sottie doesn’t necessarily feel sexual pleasure with the eyes. Also, when prof. Doane was explaining the oedipal complex, she mentioned that the fear of losing eyes is a form of castration anxiety? I am again unsure how the eyes relate to castration.

Castration Anxiety

When reading about Castration Anxiety and its relationship or any kind of connection with Death, I became also interested and found them somewhat puzzling. I know that we are talking about a boy; however, I did not quite understand how a boy could undergo such traumatic experience that is possibly equal to death (?) when discovering a girl does not possesses a penis. As Audrey mentions in her blog, I am also wondering if one’s life is equivalent to “the object of the penis” since for Freud death is the highest form of castration.

However, I have to admit that (although I just asked the question) I do not think Freud literally means “castration” when comparing to Death. I believe he would have employed such word in order to metaphorically better bring meaning to the action of “taking something away from someone”.

Although not thoroughly discussed in class, Prof. Doane mentioned that death may be thought of as the highest form of castration anxiety. If such were the case, is Freud claiming that life is equivalent to the object of the penis and, if taken away (or castrated), is death to follow? Or is the looming fear of death cause for the boy to hold onto any symbol of life?

While death can be considered connected to the idea of castration anxiety, it can also be thought of as castration anxiety. The term "death" could have been used as another way of expressing the "trauma" the boy experiences when he discovers that women do not possess penises. However, where does this trauma stem from? Why does the boy have an inherent desire for the mother to have a penis?

I am unsure whether death precedes castration anxiety, follows it, or simply is it. Does the concept of death cause the boy to enter a state of castration anxiety, fearful of what could be taken away or does the traumatic moment act as a certain death of the child? Finally, is the trauma of castration anxiety equivalent to death subconsciously? I would like a definitive reason for such an anxiety as well as the concrete result in order to understand the implications of death in Freud's work.

Both Levi-Strauss and Freud discuss the issue of incest in The Principles of Kinship and Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, respectively. I find the difference in each approach to the issue interesting: Levi-Strauss condemning incest purely because it is uneconomical, so to speak, and Freud claiming that incest is a purely natural instinct for a child (Oedipal Complex), and one which has profound effects on the child's development. However, this is not to say that Freud supports the act of incest, he simply supports the inevitabilty of a boy's subconscious desire for his mother. In short, I am intrigued by Levi-Strauss' treatment of incest in an economical light, and Freud's treatment of incest in a psychological light.

In the vein of mimesis I found the relationship of Scottie and Madeleine to be intriguing. Scottie starts to get obsessed with Madeleine who is in effect attempting to "mimic" Carlotta (in the form of hair style, the flowers, and the room). When Madeleine "dies" Scottie shifts his obsession onto Judy, who he crafts into a spitting image of Madeleine, having her "mimic" the way Madeleine dresses and acts. But when the viewer finds out that Judy was Madeleine all along, this image gets more complicated. Judy (who Scottie is making into a "copy" of Madeleine) has actually been "mimicking" the real Madeleine all along (up until her "death") and while mimicking Madeleine, Judy is also mimicking Carlotta as well. So by the end of the movie, Scottie falls in love with a copy of a copy of a copy (turning Judy into Madeleine who was Madeleine acting like Carlotta). This is all vaguely in line with the theory of performativity (very vaguely) but something that I noticed and found interesting.

Influence and Nostalgia

Similar to what Ioana touched on, I found Freud's distinction between the repressed and surmounted uncanny experiences interesting. Since he mentions how these experiences can harken back both to both personal complexes of infancy as well as primitive (so to speak) concepts, I wondered how that contributed to the idea that sexuality is predominantly a social construct. He says that the infantile and primitive aspects are connected, and perhaps overlap ("Uncanny" 157), but can they do this easily if they represent different forces on sexuality and the unconscious? Do they even work as different forces, though, or are they cut from the same cloth?

And on a different matter: if pleasure is a function of repetition, as Professor Doane mentioned, then does that agree with Levi-Strauss's idea that we have a desire for the nostalgia of a time when language had value? Would this imply that there is something inherently inferior about post-pubescent sexuality?

“Uncanny” Freud

1) I find the readings from Freud for this week to be particularly intriguing because of the two apparently contradictory moves that they seem to entail.

On the one hand – as Prof. Doane emphasized in the lectures – Freud moves from nature (essence) towards culture by proposing the model of the polymorphous child for whom all erotogenic zones are potential sources of satisfaction (Three Theories of Sexuality, 50). This model presupposes that sexual identity is not a given/ a fact of nature, but a construct – the result of struggles and cultural/social formations.

Freud’s discussion of castration anxiety and the Oedipal complex, on the other hand, appears to bring sexuality back in the realm of nature, grounding the necessity of a definitive state of inequality between men and women and of the inferiority of the latter. According to Freud, the woman is necessarily marked by lack/ castrated. Even though it appears to be intended to operate primarily at the level of the symbolic, this theory is constructed on a biological fact, supported with diverse “evidence” taken from “aesthetics” (The Uncanny, 122) and personal experience with neurotic patients, and formulated as a necessary and universal law of the Unconscious.

Thus, if the first of Freud’s moves provides fertile ground for feminism (as well as queer theory and other contemporary discourses, for that matter), the second one appears to enforce a patriarchal fixed state of affairs – given that the Oedipal complex and its implications are formulated as laws of the Unconscious – completely unacceptable for the feminists (which raises questions for me about the effectiveness of adopting the Freudian model in feminist attempts to annihilate patriarchy and its implications). Rather than merely describing the conditions of existence of a patriarchal society, Freud’s theory is enforcing/prescribing the patriarchal order while explaining it. The departure from nature was not completed.



2) What is the relation between the principle of “a repetition-compulsion” and mimesis (representation as mimesis)? Would the acceptance of “a repetition-compulsion” as a valid, necessary, and universal principle presuppose that theatre – the spectacle-machine based on repetition par excellence – is a mode of manifestation of the uncanny or an undoing of this category through the move to consciousness and to will/the voluntary?

3) Although I have doubts about the validity of Freud’s theory of sexuality, I find his theoretical approach fascinating as an epistemological undertaking. Freud indentifies “gaps in our knowledge” (Three Theories of Sexuality, 42) and proposes psycho-analysis as a method for knowledge production in order to “fill” these and create a coherent system for understanding. Presupposing a move into depth, beyond appearances, psycho-analysis as an epistemological method involves interpretation, intuition, and creativity, being superbly un-rigorous and, for this reason, a fascinating intellectual adventure for me.