“Thus, what they desire is precisely nothing, and at the same time everything. (…) Their desire is often interpreted, and feared, as a sort of insatiable hunger, a voracity that will swallow you whole.” (29)
Interestingly, in Irigaray woman (the feminine) is not denied either pleasure (on the contrary, "she" is, in a certain sense, almost polymorphously perverse - "woman has sex organs more or less everywhere" - 28, much like the child in the early stages of development of his/her sexuality in Freud's account ) or desire (this is in contrast to the position of other scholars - such as Mary Ann Doane, for example, for whom the woman only has "the desire to desire", precisely because she is denied any autonomous representation). In fact, it appears to me that desire (and pleasure) is the principle around which Irigaray’s entire discourse is organized. The problem with “the feminine” therefore becomes (for Irigaray) that, in a phallocentric society, the woman does no longer have an autonomous desire (“she will not say what she herself wants; moreover, she does not know, or no longer knows, what she wants.” - 25).
Even though I find Irigaray’s discourse fascinating and the strategic essentialism and mimicry (mimetisme) she employs, useful strategies, I believe that the organization of the discourse around the principle of desire is a weak point in her undertaking. “An Ethics of Sexual Difference” appears to be necessarily a sort of hedonistic ethics – in which attaining the greatest quantity of the greatest autonomous desire seems to be the highest goal and the defining characteristic of “a good life”.
Although I am aware (yet, not certain) that the desire principle is intimately intertwined with the psycho-analytic discourse in general, I would suggest that its replacement with another “goal” would be a possible solution for the problem of “the feminine” and its “lacks”.
Similarly, I realize (though, again, I am not certain) that the inscription of Irigaray’s discourse within the framework of psycho-analysis might require this move, but I am, nevertheless, intrigued by the fact that acceptance/refusal (resistance) is not a functioning binary in Irigaray. The woman never says “NO”: she never resists the representation that is being imposed upon her (although “she resists all definition” - 26). Nor does she play it! On the one hand, because of the postulated plurality of the sexuality (doubtful though it is, either as a fact of nature, or of culture) – because “woman is always touching herself”, she is necessarily continuously subversive (she does not respect the “taboo against touching of a highly obsessive civilization” - 27). On the other hand, the woman is necessarily continuously mysterious (28). These two aspects represent potential positions /sources of power, I would claim. The problem (and cause of the perpetual feminine subjection) is perhaps that the woman always plays the victim instead of playing the difference.
Notes
In her account, Irigaray does not attribute “the” (definite article) to “woman” (perhaps in order to suggest that the feminine has no determination). I believe this to be a reinforcement of a/the “phallocentric order”. For this reason – as you might have already noticed – I am using “the woman” in my post.
For me, strategic essentialism and mimicry (mimetisme) are instances of playing the difference.
I believe that the question "Does this critique of Freud go so far as to challenge psychoanalytic theory and practice?" posed to Irigaray in "The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine" interview (72) justly (though implicitly) points to the necessity of re-considering the fundamental tenets of psychoanalysis (as a theoretical body). It appears to me that - without this necessary reassessment - programmatically working in the domain of psychoanalysis involves the acceptance of several inevitable foundational principles that prevent the development of diverse directions of thought and eventually lead to circular arguments.
Question Marks
Why is/should “the alternative between a defensive virginity, fiercely turned in upon itself, and a body open to penetration” (24) (be) “impossible” ?
Why does Riddles of the Sphinx (which I found aesthetically fascinating) propose the necessity of giving up the Mother-position? In my view, this is a most unreasonable move and an instance of NOT-playing the difference that might result in the enforcement of feminine subjection. (Matriarchy, I would argue, was grounded precisely in the acknowledgment of the privileged role of woman as child-bearer)
Thursday, March 19, 2009
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment