Thursday, February 12, 2009
When discussing Levi-Strauss’ idea of myths in class, it was brought up that there exist many differences between Levi Strauss’ work and that of Barthes. For Levi-Strauss, a myth is a universal structure of mind. For Barthes, however, there exist no universal bonds as he believes every individual attempts to create his or her own meaning and no meaning is thus “fixed”. While the focuses of Levi-Strauss and Barthes’ theories center on universality and individuality respectively, similarities are present. For instance, I found that Levi-Strauss’ rejection of an “original” myth was reminiscent of Barthes’ “The Death of the Author”. Both theories disregard initial creation in favor of reaction. Similarly, the myth according to Levi-Strauss acts as an unconscious structure and product of the mind, much alike Barthes’ concept of writing in that readers supply the meaning for a piece of writing. My question then is, to what extent do readers, albeit creating different meanings, fall under a universal group? Each reader undergoes the same process of interpretation so does the process of individuality become evidence for a greater universality? Also, does Levi-Strauss’ incorporate individualistic undertones in the sense that he defines myth as an unconscious product of the mind? Or does he consider all unconscious thoughts in all minds to be alike?
On Structure without structure
My contribution to the blog this week is in the form of a string of notes, observations, and puzzlements:
1) In Levi-Stauss’s The Science of the Concrete, “classify(ing)”, “order”, “organization”, and, of course, “relation(s)” and “system(s)” are recurring terms. On page 15, Levi-Strauss even asserts (appears to assert) that “Any classification is superior to chaos and even a classification at the level of sensible properties is a step towards rational ordering”. In a sense, therefore, structuralism (understood here as the method that Levi-Strauss is proposing for knowledge acquisition) appears to be an undertaking whose goal is to make sense of the world by putting order into the “things out there”. These observations represent the grounds for the hypothesis that there is a connection between structuralism and rationalism, or, perhaps, even that structuralism is an “updated” and equally abstract version of rationalism that refocuses attention from the human being/subject as possessor of reason to an abstract entity (“structure”). (To what extent )Can “structure” be viewed as a substitution and re-consideration of the (once upon a time) all powerful “reason”?
Despite the differences, it appears to me that both “reason” and “structure” do a similar kind of work: they offer a tool (as well as a vocabulary) for making "sense" (however vague this notion might be) of a world of variables and unknowns.
2) I find Levi-Strauss’s discussion of the concept of the “sign” as an operative principle in relation to the “two parallel modes of acquiring knowledge” (the engineer and the bricoleur) (13) he posits particularly worthy of consideration in the context of an investigation of “Structuralism” and “Structure” (as the one Benveniste is undertaking in the reading for this week). Levi-Strauss’s “splitting” of the sign, his separation of (the inseparable, for Saussure) “concept” and “image” from the “sign” indicates, in my view, that “the sign” and “structure” are constructs, rather than some sort of necessary “essences”. Even though I am aware that Levi-Strauss does not explicitly make such a move, I believe that acknowledging that “structure” and the “sign” are human/cultural constructs (therefore, not necessary) would be an act of honesty and, perhaps, bravery that would make structuralism all the more fascinating for me.
3) Although I admire Levi-Strauss’ attempt to denounce the validity of the denomination “primitive(s)” as applied to certain groups (which also seems to be consonant with his rejection of “origins”), I believe that he does not altogether succeed in undoing the inferior/superior scale commonly in operation in some discourses about diverse human societies/groups (most of the discourses before him, I would suggest). In his discussion on the “engineer” and the “bricoleur” it appears (to me, at least) that the “engineer” is placed on a higher rung on an abstract hierarchical ladder than the “bricoleur” is. In support of this idea, I would like to mention Levi-Strauss’s explicit appreciation for science and the scientific method (he refutes Freud’s argument in Totem and Taboo precisely for not being “scientific” enough and aims to (re)establish psychoanalysis as a “social science”).
4) Finally, I would like to point to – what I believe to be – a similarity/correspondence between the event-to structure progression in myth and the structure-to-event progression in science, on the one hand, and the inductive (necessarily fallible) method and the deductive (truth-preserving) method identified in traditional philosophy. Interestingly, in traditional philosophy, the inductive method – not the deductive one, which the proposed parallelism would imply, is associated with science.
1) In Levi-Stauss’s The Science of the Concrete, “classify(ing)”, “order”, “organization”, and, of course, “relation(s)” and “system(s)” are recurring terms. On page 15, Levi-Strauss even asserts (appears to assert) that “Any classification is superior to chaos and even a classification at the level of sensible properties is a step towards rational ordering”. In a sense, therefore, structuralism (understood here as the method that Levi-Strauss is proposing for knowledge acquisition) appears to be an undertaking whose goal is to make sense of the world by putting order into the “things out there”. These observations represent the grounds for the hypothesis that there is a connection between structuralism and rationalism, or, perhaps, even that structuralism is an “updated” and equally abstract version of rationalism that refocuses attention from the human being/subject as possessor of reason to an abstract entity (“structure”). (To what extent )Can “structure” be viewed as a substitution and re-consideration of the (once upon a time) all powerful “reason”?
Despite the differences, it appears to me that both “reason” and “structure” do a similar kind of work: they offer a tool (as well as a vocabulary) for making "sense" (however vague this notion might be) of a world of variables and unknowns.
2) I find Levi-Strauss’s discussion of the concept of the “sign” as an operative principle in relation to the “two parallel modes of acquiring knowledge” (the engineer and the bricoleur) (13) he posits particularly worthy of consideration in the context of an investigation of “Structuralism” and “Structure” (as the one Benveniste is undertaking in the reading for this week). Levi-Strauss’s “splitting” of the sign, his separation of (the inseparable, for Saussure) “concept” and “image” from the “sign” indicates, in my view, that “the sign” and “structure” are constructs, rather than some sort of necessary “essences”. Even though I am aware that Levi-Strauss does not explicitly make such a move, I believe that acknowledging that “structure” and the “sign” are human/cultural constructs (therefore, not necessary) would be an act of honesty and, perhaps, bravery that would make structuralism all the more fascinating for me.
3) Although I admire Levi-Strauss’ attempt to denounce the validity of the denomination “primitive(s)” as applied to certain groups (which also seems to be consonant with his rejection of “origins”), I believe that he does not altogether succeed in undoing the inferior/superior scale commonly in operation in some discourses about diverse human societies/groups (most of the discourses before him, I would suggest). In his discussion on the “engineer” and the “bricoleur” it appears (to me, at least) that the “engineer” is placed on a higher rung on an abstract hierarchical ladder than the “bricoleur” is. In support of this idea, I would like to mention Levi-Strauss’s explicit appreciation for science and the scientific method (he refutes Freud’s argument in Totem and Taboo precisely for not being “scientific” enough and aims to (re)establish psychoanalysis as a “social science”).
4) Finally, I would like to point to – what I believe to be – a similarity/correspondence between the event-to structure progression in myth and the structure-to-event progression in science, on the one hand, and the inductive (necessarily fallible) method and the deductive (truth-preserving) method identified in traditional philosophy. Interestingly, in traditional philosophy, the inductive method – not the deductive one, which the proposed parallelism would imply, is associated with science.
Thursday, February 5, 2009
“This is a universe”
In Michael Snow’s film, the author says, “the author would like to have been first (to make films that concentrate on texts), but it’s too late. In some respects this is first. Obviously this is not the first time that this has been used for the first time. This belongs to everybody.” It was definitely a diversion of thinking. I found an interesting point there: a transformational meaning of the word “this.” At the beginning, “this” indicated “films that concentrate on texts.” But its meaning got changed to a just demonstrative pronoun, a word “this,” which means “this” could be or indicate anything. “This” became a representation of universe. As author says, “this belongs to everybody. This means this, you think this, wee see this, they use this.” This is a signifier.
This arbitrariness is shown in paintings as well. Surrealistic artist, Rene Magritte draw a pipe and write like this: “ceci n’est pas une pipe(This is not a pipe)”, right under the pipe. When we see the painting, we immediately and almost automatically think “this” image is a pipe, and “this” is a pipe, that is why we get confused when we see the sentence “ceci n’est pas une pipe.” It is arbitrariness. Since image is a just imitation, and language is a just representation, image and language both are arbitrary.
This arbitrariness is shown in paintings as well. Surrealistic artist, Rene Magritte draw a pipe and write like this: “ceci n’est pas une pipe(This is not a pipe)”, right under the pipe. When we see the painting, we immediately and almost automatically think “this” image is a pipe, and “this” is a pipe, that is why we get confused when we see the sentence “ceci n’est pas une pipe.” It is arbitrariness. Since image is a just imitation, and language is a just representation, image and language both are arbitrary.
This, I, You
Focusing on “So Is This”, I noticed that throughout the film, Snow refers to himself as “the author”, not “I” or “the director”. He makes a choice of not using the pronoun “I” to refer to himself, yet refers to the viewer as “you” and repetitiously emphasizes the word “this”. The usual role-shifting of the words “I” and “you” does not occur between the author and the viewer. It only occurs in the viewer’s mind, as he or she translates the “you” that he/she sees to the concept of self.
On the other hand, Snow overuses the word “this”. “This” is a true shifter; the meaning can be occupied by any referent, and it isn’t always clear in the film what the referent is in that particular context. Snow’s decision to emphasize the shifter “this” and confuse the viewer at times, but refrain from using “I” and simplify the thought process (although at most times unconsciously done) of going back and forth from “you” and “I” raises the question, was Snow’s intention to confuse or not to confuse the viewers? Was it just a personal preference to choose the word “this” for emphasis rather than “you” or “I” or any other pronoun? Or does his intention not even matter because of what Barthe claims about authorial intentions?
Perhaps it was that “this” can refer to a lot more things than “you” or “I” can. If used, “I” would only refer to the author himself in this case, because there is no direct communication between the author and the viewer. It is one-sided. The author can refer to the viewer as “you”, and the meaning of the word “you” would be occupied by anyone present in the room, whereas saying “I” would only refer to Snow himself throughout the whole film. The viewer referring to themselves by saying “I” in their minds, wouldn’t count necessarily because it never gets delivered to the author; it never gets uttered and it just remains as a concept of the self. Referring to himself as “I” would have just been less interesting for Snow because in the context, “I” wouldn’t play its full role as a shifter; it would just remain a word describing the author. Also, since the viewers are “reading” the film, using “I” instead of “author” would just simply confuse them because they are saying to themselves “I” for the author and “you” for themselves, but have to switch them back in their heads.
On the other hand, Snow overuses the word “this”. “This” is a true shifter; the meaning can be occupied by any referent, and it isn’t always clear in the film what the referent is in that particular context. Snow’s decision to emphasize the shifter “this” and confuse the viewer at times, but refrain from using “I” and simplify the thought process (although at most times unconsciously done) of going back and forth from “you” and “I” raises the question, was Snow’s intention to confuse or not to confuse the viewers? Was it just a personal preference to choose the word “this” for emphasis rather than “you” or “I” or any other pronoun? Or does his intention not even matter because of what Barthe claims about authorial intentions?
Perhaps it was that “this” can refer to a lot more things than “you” or “I” can. If used, “I” would only refer to the author himself in this case, because there is no direct communication between the author and the viewer. It is one-sided. The author can refer to the viewer as “you”, and the meaning of the word “you” would be occupied by anyone present in the room, whereas saying “I” would only refer to Snow himself throughout the whole film. The viewer referring to themselves by saying “I” in their minds, wouldn’t count necessarily because it never gets delivered to the author; it never gets uttered and it just remains as a concept of the self. Referring to himself as “I” would have just been less interesting for Snow because in the context, “I” wouldn’t play its full role as a shifter; it would just remain a word describing the author. Also, since the viewers are “reading” the film, using “I” instead of “author” would just simply confuse them because they are saying to themselves “I” for the author and “you” for themselves, but have to switch them back in their heads.
02-03 Lecture (personal reflection)
I truely believe and appreciate about my uniqueness and that of people around me especially as I was cautiously making assumption about the world functioning in a wheel of harmony. Harmony is achieved by the infinite polarities created by the very existance of every single one of us with different and unique personality, talent, character and etc.
Now that it is established each individual is unique in some ways. Let us examine how we refer such self. In order to refer a self that is so unique, different, and thus inportant self, I personally employ this single letter, "I". I would not possibly assert that I know perfertly everything about myself. But, I can humbly tell you that it would be me who knows about myself better more than anyone in the world. With this self-recognition, I have enough knowledge and confidence to refer "my - self" as "I".
However, no matter how hard (although in reality everyone just take the use of "I" for granted) one should try to the level of self-recognition enabling oneself to call his or her self" as "I", I would not be only one using "I" to refer my ego: everyone in fact refers him/herself as "I". In some ways, do you not wonder about the possible hindrance upon your subjectivity and individuality? It is also true that while referring yourself as "I", you are losing the very notion of your "self" that is very critical and priceless. It seems to me I am giving up uniqueness and individuality, what is the result of long time self investigation and investment when using "I".
This type of concern and feeling of frustration do not last long. Instead, they are replaced by the thoughts that once again amaze me about humanity and myself. In fact, did I lose individuality? Or, am I not the person I was before? This is what's so profound--I (this applies to everyone) am still holding on and able to differenciate my "self" from others.
Now that it is established each individual is unique in some ways. Let us examine how we refer such self. In order to refer a self that is so unique, different, and thus inportant self, I personally employ this single letter, "I". I would not possibly assert that I know perfertly everything about myself. But, I can humbly tell you that it would be me who knows about myself better more than anyone in the world. With this self-recognition, I have enough knowledge and confidence to refer "my - self" as "I".
However, no matter how hard (although in reality everyone just take the use of "I" for granted) one should try to the level of self-recognition enabling oneself to call his or her self" as "I", I would not be only one using "I" to refer my ego: everyone in fact refers him/herself as "I". In some ways, do you not wonder about the possible hindrance upon your subjectivity and individuality? It is also true that while referring yourself as "I", you are losing the very notion of your "self" that is very critical and priceless. It seems to me I am giving up uniqueness and individuality, what is the result of long time self investigation and investment when using "I".
This type of concern and feeling of frustration do not last long. Instead, they are replaced by the thoughts that once again amaze me about humanity and myself. In fact, did I lose individuality? Or, am I not the person I was before? This is what's so profound--I (this applies to everyone) am still holding on and able to differenciate my "self" from others.
" no one, no 'person', says it: its source, its voice, is not the true place of the writing, which is reading."
Does So This Is subvert Barthes' statement or reinforce it?
I was shocked while watching So This Is by how often I felt like it was a narrated film. The voice in my head, though obviously my own, felt distinctly different. Doesn't the act of reading resurrect the author to a certain extent? Snow's voice--or my rendition of his voice--was so present in the film despite being silent. So This Is seemed to exhibit the opposite of Barthes' assertion--Snow hijacked my own voice and inner dialogue. By reading I was rendered useless, hypnotized.
Does So This Is subvert Barthes' statement or reinforce it?
I was shocked while watching So This Is by how often I felt like it was a narrated film. The voice in my head, though obviously my own, felt distinctly different. Doesn't the act of reading resurrect the author to a certain extent? Snow's voice--or my rendition of his voice--was so present in the film despite being silent. So This Is seemed to exhibit the opposite of Barthes' assertion--Snow hijacked my own voice and inner dialogue. By reading I was rendered useless, hypnotized.
Las Meninas
Foucault's essay on 'Las Meninas' primarily deals with the representations of the multiple subjects of the painting, and characterizes the hierarchy of figures based on the lines of their gazes and on lines of perspective. He delves into the relationships between the representation of the painter (Velasquez himself), the absent (King and Queen), the Infanta, and the spectators (both the man in the background and us as viewers). While Foucault's observations and arguments are astute, I think he fails to raise an important point in discussing the painting. He really only discusses a story created by the painting itself that is essentially fiction; he fails to discuss the fact that this representation was actually painted in real life, from real models other than the King and the Queen. Foucault speaks extensively on the represented painting (or at least the back of it) but we are left with the question: What about the process of creating the actual painting in front of us by the actual man himself?
Foucault speaks of two intersecting lines coming from the mirror and from the eyes of the Infanta, and that the true subject of the painting is the point where these lines cross, outside of the canvas. He says that this point can be occupied by the King and Queen, reflected in the mirror, and by the absent spectator. However, when creating the real painting, this point would have been occupied by Velasquez. This leads me to believe that the true subject of the painting is the painter and his process.
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